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At the time of writing, China still has not managed to become a proud member of
the WTO, but China's membership is imminent.' The question this article tries to answer
is what factors have delayed China's entry. It is argued here that apart from foreign
policy, it is especially the transitional nature of China's economy and legal system that
caused the world's major economic powers to delay China's accession into the WTO.
Nevertheless, the answer is complex and structured around the politico-historical
problems surrounding the relations between China and the West, discussed in Part A,
and the difficulties surrounding the unfinished Chinese economic and legal reforms,
discussed in Parts B and C, respectively.
A look at the politico-historical background in Part A will reveal that China's rela-
tionship with the West has always been problematic. By looking into the diplomatic
efforts of recent decades and evaluating China's performance in other Bretton Woods
institutions, this section will try to find out whether China can become a constructive
member of the world's multilateral trading system.
Part A will further focus on issues such as Taiwan's accession bid, Chinese human
rights, and U.S. ideological questions, which are believed to have stood at the centre of
the political debate concerning Chinese accession. They will reveal the complex political
nature of WTO accession as part of the explanation why China's accession process has
dragged on for such a long period.
Part B will then examine China's necessary economic reforms to make the country
WTO compatible. Establishing a market economy is the first fundamental premise upon
which WTO compliance is built. More specifically, the difficulties concerning state-owned
enterprise reform centered on Articles XVII GATT and VIII GATS will play a decisive
role in whether and how China will comply with WTO standards.
Finally, in Part C, domestic legal reforms, as a second prerequisite for WTO com-
pliance, will be discussed mainly in view of the transparency requirements set forth in
Article X GATT. Establishing the Rule of Law is another hurdle to be taken by a transi-
tion economy like China to support the underlying principles of the WTO. Considerable
1. Beijing hoped to bring China into the WTO in the year 2000. Recently negotiations have
been hampered by disagreements over how China will implement WTO rules on intellectual
property and meet its other trade obligations. According to Western diplomats the stalemate
could delay China's entry into the WTO well into 2001. See, e.g., Clinton Signs PNTR Bill into
Law, CHINAONLINE NEws, Oct. 10, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com. Currently those
parts of the 1997 Draft Protocol that remain open must be finalised. Second, the results of
China's bilateral negotiations with WTO members must be tabled formally, and discussed
with a view to the Working Party agreeing on how they are to be incorporated into the
multilateral system. Third, negotiations must be completed and agreement reached on the
annexes to China's Draft Protocol. See Richard Eglin, Challenges and Implications of China
Joining the WTO, at http://www.wto.org.
Winter/Spring 2001 39
effort will therefore be spent on judicial review and enforcement to service a transparent
-legal system necessary to subsequently implement WTO norms.
Eventually this article explains that apart from the politico-historical difficulties sur-
rounding China's accession, the unfinished reforms form the main difficulty for China to
enter the WTO. Despite tremendous progress, the Chinese transition economy does not
seem to manage the requirements set forth in Articles X and XVII GATT and VIII GATS
in a way that comforts the Western trading powers. Of concern is that China's large
state-owned economy could enable the country to evade the effective responsibilities and
policies of GATT/WTO, even though such an economy can be in complete conformity
with the technical rules of the WTO.
A. SOCIO-POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
TO CHINAS ACCESSION
Undoubtedly, China's entry into the WTO will be of great political significance.
Nonetheless, many contested issues, not only economic, but also human rights questions
and ideological differences remain. It is the wish of many that Chinas accession to
the WTO will ensure the country to become a "constructive member" of the global
community.2 To this end, political solutions must be found for the categories, problems
and procedure of Chinese membership.
1. China and the World Community
The purpose of this section is to identify the many difficulties and hurdles that exist
in the political relationship between China and the West. The recent policies of engage-
ment, however, have tried to positively integrate China in the international community.
a. Relations in Early Years
Apart from trade along established routes the Chinese Empire had no significant
political relationship with the West prior to the Opium Wars beginning in 1839. The
Chinese, as the Japanese, were very much reluctant to open doors for Westerners,
who they believed were barbarians.3 Traditional Chinese foreign relations did not fully
2. See Lester J. Gesteland, Clinton Says WTO Entry Will Make China "Constructive Member"
of Global Community, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Jan. 29, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com
(quoting from President Clinton's State of the Union Address: "We must continue to encour-
age our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, prosperous, democratic
nations.").
3. See CONRAD BRANT ET AL., A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 17 (1952):
"Ethnocentrism was inbred in Chinese language and institutions, with the assumption that
outer barbarian states, however strong in arms, were always inferior in the attributes of strong
civilisation.' According to the authors anyone taking a quick look at Chinese history must
agree that nationalism has not yet by any means realised its full potentialities in Modern
China. The Chinese people thought and acted as the centre of the known world in a recorded
history for 3000 years. China viewed itself as superior, not just materially, but culturally.
Barbarians could come to appreciate the superiority of the Chinese culture if they recognised
the unique position of China as the central kingdom exercising the mandate of heaven.
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recognise foreign countries as sovereigns. Only when a country paid tribute to appreciate
the superiority of the Chinese culture, did China allow it the opportunity for trade.'
The attitude that China did not need anything from other countries sparked conflicts
with nineteenth century imperial powers like France and Great Britain. These conflicts
caused the tribute system to give way to the Treaty system. Through the "Unequal
Treaties" of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these Western powers finally
forced themselves in. China was compelled to conclude with many countries treaties that
provided for extraterritoriality (also known as consular jurisdiction) for the nationals
of those countries in China, restrictive tariff regulations, territorial cessions and leases,
the right to station foreign troops in China, and other humiliating infringements on
sovereignty.5 Pursuant to these treaties and the initial hostile contacts, which accounted
for the xenophobia in the age of imperialism,6 China was treated like a semi-colonial
country.
While China had exploited and manipulated tributary countries under the tribute
system, China became the subject of manipulation under the unequal treaties. Foreign
powers rushed to obtain the advantages. However, the MFN principle, introduced as a
bargaining tool for China, created the opposite effect of destroying China's bargaining
power.7
A weakened country, China lost the imperial monarchy in the 1911 revolution led
by Sun Yat Sen. The following decades were rare times during which China was actively
involved in world politics.' Soon after, it was divided by civil warfare between the Com-
munists and the capitalist Kuomintang government. When the Communist Party came
to power in 1949, and established the People's Republic of China, the country fell prey to
4. On the tributary system from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) through the Manchurian Qing
dynasty (1644-1912), see generally JOHN K FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA
COAST: THE OPENING OF THE TREATY PORTS, 1842-1854 (1953). See also MARK MANCALL,
CHINA AT THE CENTER: 300 YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY (1984). For the relevance in present
day China, see Gretchen Harders-Chen, Note, China MFN A Reaffirmation of Tradition or
Regulatory Reform?, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 381, 381-413 (1996).
5. See Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal
Treaties, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239, 239-67(Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1972).
6. On anti-foreignism in China, see KUANG-SHENG LIAO, ANTI-FOREIGNISM AND MODERNIZA-
TION IN CHINA, 1860-1980: LINKAGE BETWEEN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
(1984). See also Yong Deng, The Chinese Conception of National Interests and International
Relations, CHINA Q. 308-29 (June 1988). According to Deng, the "Realpolitik Thinking" of
China is still profoundly conditioned by the historical memory of the "one hundred years of
sufferings and humiliations" at the hands of Western powers and fascist Japan. China suffered
both materially and psychologically.
7. The MFN clause proved to be a one-way street-any concession or privilege gained by one
Western power at once accrued to all. China could never reverse the tide, and by abolishing
the privileges of one power, eliminate those of others. Treaty privileges steadily accumulated
against her interest, thus weakening Chinese institutional structure. See Harders-Chen, supra
note 4, at 390.
8. E.g., China was represented at the Congress of Versailles where it signed the 1919 peace treaty
and in the League of Nations, where it objected to the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese
in 1931. For further reference, see Cohen, supra note 5.
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the Cold War politics of isolationism. China was involved in the two hot spots of Korea
and Vietnam and therefore put under embargo by the United States between 1953 and
1972. 9 Both the international and domestic situation had limited any further expansion
of economic relations with China.
These early psychological and material sufferings under Western treaty rule explain
China's insistence on reciprocity to bring home fairness and equity in multilateral trade."°
b. Official Relations
Notwithstanding the difficulties in the past, governments have adopted policies of
engagement since recent decades.
In an effort to doom the Soviet Empire by driving it apart from other Communist
allies, President Nixon and his foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted normal
diplomatic relations with China."1 The European Communities soon followed,' 2 notwith-
standing that some EC Member States already had established diplomatic relations. 3
9. As a result of the deterioration of the political atmosphere in the beginning of the 1950s
normal trade relations between China and many of the GATT Contracting Parties ceased to
exist, but since the 1960s the share of trade with GATT Contracting Parties gradually acquired
more importance. See Chung-Chow Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J. WORLD
TRADE 4, 28 (1987). Despite the U.S. embargo, trade and barter arrangements with the U.K.,
France and Denmark were concluded and in the early 1960s China purchased a number of
industrial plants from EC Member States. See X. Yue, Current EC Legal Developments-The
EC and China, BUTTERWORTHS 4 (1993).
10. See Harders-Chen, supra note 4.
11. The official visit by Nixon led to the Shanghai Communique in 1972. On January 1, 1979,
the relationship was bolstered in the Joint Communiqu6 on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations. See 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 25 (Jan. 1979). This was followed by People's Republic
of China, Consular Relations, Jan. 31, 1979 (U.S.-P.R.C., 30 U.S.T. 17). Soon thereafter, on
July 7, 1979, the Agreement on Trade Relations between the two countries was signed. See
31 U.S.T. 4651; see also Fox Butterfield, U.S. and China Mark Resumption of Ties in Peking
Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1979, at Al, A10.
12. Official relations between the European Economic Community and China were initiated in
1975. In 1983, the relationship was officially expanded to include also the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). A trade
agreement was signed in 1978, followed by the 1985 Trade and Co-operation Agreement (see
OJ L250 19. 9.85 p. 1). In 1995, a Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations was adopted
(see Com (95) 0279-C4-0288/95). For more on China-Europe relations, see Willem Van der
Geest, Bringing China into the Concert of Nations: An Analysis of Its Accession to the WTO,
32 J. WORLD TRADE 3, 99-114 (1998); see also Yue, supra note 9, at 4. For the latest details
on EU-China relations, see "Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the Implementation of the Communication 'Building a Comprehensive Part-
nership with China," at www.europe.org, COM (2000) 552, Aug. 9, 2000.
13. Among the earliest were Denmark (11 May 1950), United Kingdom (17 June 1954),
Netherlands (19 November 1954) and France (27 January 1964). A number of EC Member
States took the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations during the 1970s. These are inter
alia: Italy (6 November 1970), Belgium (25 October 1971), Greece (5 June 1972), Germany
(11 October 1972), Luxembourg (16 November 1972), Spain (9 March 1973), Portugal (8
February 1979) and Ireland (22 June 1979).
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The U.S. administration has repeated its commitment to supporting China's acces-
sion to the WTO in almost every bilateral negotiation. The realisation of the commit-
ment, however, depends on the actual improvement of the bilateral relationship between
the United States and China. This relationship is still unpredictable, even after the
Jiang-Clinton summit in October 1997.14 It is also under threat from non-economic
issues like human rights, 5 the Taiwan channel, 6 and nuclear proliferation. 7 U.S. Presi-
dent Clinton explained his 'pragmatic policy of engagement' as "expanding our areas of
co-operation with China while confronting our differences openly and respectfully."' I
The overall aim of the European policy is to foster a greater European presence in
the Asia-Pacific region. Political-strategic matters thereto are reviewed in an EC Com-
munication. The EU approach of "engagement" focuses on increasing the likelihood that
China will act as a "responsible" member of the international community. This encom-
passes the degree of economic openness, the reliability of the judicial system, and the
protection of individual, human and social rights."
In 1971, the People's Republic of China replaced capitalist rival Taiwan in the United
Nations Organisation and took a seat in its Security Council.2" By 1980, China joined
the IMF and the World Bank2' and after it gained observer status to the GATT in 1984,
it applied for membership in 1986. It renewed this application in 1995 to become a
member of the newly established WTO.22
Further, China developed good relations with its trading partner Japan; strong
relations with Vietnam, India, and Nepal; and diplomatic ties with Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tadjikistan were also established.23
14. Wei Zhao, China's WTO Accession: Commitments and Prospects, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 2, 51-75
(1998); see also THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: A GREATER CHINA
PERSPECTIVE (Y.Y. Kueh & Brian Bridges eds., 1997).
15. See infra section A.2.b (Human Rights Issues).
16. See infra section A.2.a (Taiwan's bid for WTO access).
17. For example, the proposal to add weapons non-proliferation language to the Perma-
nent Trade Relations Bill. See Charles A. Snyder, U.S. Senate Rejects Thompson Amend-
ment, Virtually Assuring Passage of PNTR, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Sept. 13, 2000, at
http://www.chinaonline.net. On Permanent Trade Relations, see infra section A.2.c (Ideolog-
ical Differences: United States Law).
18. Remarks by President in Address on China and the National Interest, VOICE OF AMERICA,
Oct. 24, 1997.
19. See COM (1998) 181 and COM (2000) 552, supra note 12; see also Van der Geest, supra
note 12, at 101.
20. On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 (XXVI)
to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China and to expel the representatives
of Chiang Kai-shek from the U.N. See General Assembly Official Records, 26th Sess., Supp.
No. 29 (A/8429) at 2.
21. See HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF,
THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 59. The IMF and
World Bank were, just like the United Nations, initially not open to communist Beijing, but
to capitalist Taipe. In 1950, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and India already asked the PRC to
replace Taiwan.
22. For full details, see infra section A.2 (The Road to WTO Accession).
23. Guiguo Wang, Economic Integration in Quest for Law: The Chinese Experience, J. WORLD
TRADE 10 (Apr. 1995).
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c. International Relations with Chinese Characteristics
Because of its difficult past in establishing international relationships, many
observers are interested in how China will develop as a member of international
organisations and the international community at large. As a growing economic power
China understands the need of participating in international and regional affairs. 4 Its
domestic economic reforms require this participation.
25
International economic law has taken a prominent place in international relations.
26
The economic component in international affairs has expanded sharply, largely at the
expense of ideological and security concerns. Perhaps nowhere has this happened more
clearly than in Sino-U.S. relations. 27 Liberalism and economic nationalism address the
economic characteristics of these relations.
By joining the international economy, China tries to enhance its national aggran-
disement (exactly what realism, alternatively called economic nationalism, stands for 28).
China's WTO membership brings the country international acclaim and prestige. The
international investor confidence resulting from WTO membership determines its attrac-
tiveness and allows the country to amass foreign capital to pay for sound domestic
reforms and, hence, further industrialisation. The momentum of this drive must turn
China into an economic powerhouse. 29 An export-oriented growth policy suits this
doctrine.
To some scholars China has taken the protective coloration of a market economy
while at the same time retaining an overall mercantilist policy.3" Neo-mercantilism will
inescapably lead to more protectionism and interventionism in international economic
affairs.3
24. See, e.g., Samuel S. Kim, Mainland China in a Changing Asia-Pacific Regional Order, 30 Iss.
& STUD. 1 (Oct. 1994); see also JONATHAN R. WOETZEL, CHINA'S ECONOMIC OPENING TO THE
OUTSIDE WORLD: THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1989). China must play a role in global
economic management. Some Western authors therefore believe China should participate in
the finance G-7, the club of finance ministers and central bank governors. See, e.g., C. Fred
Bergsten, The New Agenda with China, Institute for International Economics, May 1998, at
http://www.iie.com.
25. Wang, supra note 23, at 7. Specific steps to participate in multilateral organisations were
taken almost immediately after China started economic reforms.
26. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations The-
ory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 367-97 (1998);
see also John Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations
Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 139-229 (1996).
27. Jacques deLisle, Of Chinese Walls, Battering Rams, and Building Permits: Five Lessons About
International Economic Law from Sino-U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 513, 515 (1996).
28. See Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT Two Theories of Political Economy Explaining China's
Desire for Membership in the GATT, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 431, 437 (1994). Illuminating
in this regard is also the article by Deng, supra note 6.
29. See generally Hsiao, supra note 28, at 439.
30. See JACOBSON & OKSENB*ERG, supra note 21, at 10.
31. See generally RAH BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES & MATERIALS, ch. 1 (1996); see
also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
ch. 1 (1995).
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It must be acknowledged, however, that with China embracing capitalism in the age
of globalisation, realpolitik has somewhat been put in the defensive in favour of a more
liberal rhetoric in China.32
The surge in liberalism explains why China's Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology is
downgraded in present economic policy. In undertaking WTO commitments, China is
devoted to economic efficiency, maximisation of economic growth, and improvement of
living standards."
Realism and liberalism are especially useful for China's political rulers to sell WTO
principles domestically. China's past experiences with the world community would not
easily accept WAlTO concessions if they resulted from foreign pressure instead of an
allegedly more neutral political forum. It also helps local leaders reinforce domestic
reforms.34 These reforms are the focal point to improve domestic performance. If they
achieve success then China will seek greater voice and power. A more assertive China
could then begin to express itself.
WTO membership will further legitimise China's stance in the world community
and will confirm China's economic integration in the world economy by adopting a free
market based on liberalised trade.
d. China's Participation in IMF and World Bank
China's participation in the IMF and the World Bank might reveal something about
the possible course China will take in the WTO. However, the policy vis-a-vis IMF
and World Bank is distinct from an envisaged WTO membership, because neither IMF
nor World Bank membership involved such large economic reforms in China as WTO
membership. What image of China can we possibly expect and can the Bretton Woods
organisations continue to support the underlying Western economic values?
The importance of lending by the World Bank and the International Development
Association (IDA) should not be underestimated.3" These loans serve as a sign of security
to private investors and help funnel foreign capital and technology to China.3 6 Several
32. E.g., Jiang Zemin's speech at the quasi-summit on November 15, 1994, talking about how
nuclear proliferation, AIDS prevention, etc. are all of an interdependent nature and require
co-operation and commonly observed standards, as well as trade contracts and market devel-
opment. FBIS-China, Nov. 15, 1994, at 2; see also Deng, supra note 6, at 320, 329 (Deng
acknowledges a liberal undercurrent in the dominant realist paradigm).
33. See Hsiao supra note 28, at 446.
34. See, e.g., JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 21, at 93.
35. China is a major recipient of multilateral official lending. The United States has recently
questioned whether China should continue to receive concessional finance through the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA), the World Bank soft loan window. IDA funds have
accounted for about a quarter of China's $22 billion in World Bank loans since 1980, and
China has been receiving approximately $1 billion annually from IDA for the last several
years. See Marcus Noland, China and the International Economic System, Institute for Inter-
national Economics, Working Paper 95-6, at http://www.iie.com.
36. See Bing Ling, China and International Institutions, 90 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 397 (1996).
Since China's membership in the World Bank, the latter has approved many projects. China
has been the Bank's biggest borrowing member country since 1993, and has one of the
best project implementation records. To attract more loans, the country joined the Asian
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Chinese bureaucrats highly praise the technical assistance that they have received from
the Bank and the Fund.37 Financial assistance, competitive bidding, foreign consultants,
and training of personnel have changed the Chinese mind about how to undertake
certain projects and how to reduce costs and improve quality.3"
However, China slowly wants to get rid of its image as a passive receiver of capital,
technology, or economic and social values from other nations. By gradually flexing its
economic power, China wants a share of mercantile diplomacy to influence decisions at
the international level.39
Therefore, the incorporation of China into the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO
on terms that preserve and advance the neo-liberal international economic order is not
easy. It is a test to the capacity of these institutions to adjust to a changing environment."
So far, China is not seeking to make incremental changes in the rules of the Bretton
Woods institutions so that Chinese traditions and practices would be incorporated into
the operations of these institutions. But, in future the existing arrangements could come
under pressure if China continues to pursue political power under economic nationalism.
Moreover, China has had its own values shared by foreign countries and individuals
and still employs its own values of conducting economic exchanges.41 China's participa-
tion in international organisations and economic exchanges creates interaction between
the legal, social and other values of the Chinese people42 and those of other peoples' juris-
dictions in the process of globalisation and regionalisation of business law.43 It reveals,
Development Bank without the pre-condition of Taiwan's leaving in 1986. See Wang, supra
note 23, at 8. On China's membership in the Asian Development Bank, see Bruce Murray,
Prospects for Prosperity, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Oct. 19, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
37. See JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 21, at 141-42.
38. The U.S. administration regards technical assistance as the primary channel through which
it can influence economic reform in China. See Noland, supra note 35.
39. See Deng, supra note 6, at 314 (noting that China's foreign policy is still very much pulled
back by power politics and Realpolitik). On realism and liberalism in China, see supra part
A.1.c. (International Relations with Chinese Characteristics).
40. See JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 21, at 4.
41. Reference is made here to the tributary system mentioned supra.
42. Deng, supra note 6, at 312 contends that the recent debate over civilizational clashes and
human rights must be viewed in terms of the struggle between Western cultural expansion
and third world countries' attempts to defend their "cultural sovereignty."
43. A clear example in this regard according to Wang is the Chinese favour for the use of a
non-adversarial dispute resolution system. See Wang, supra note 23, at 22. On dispute resolu-
tion in China, see, e.g., Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xiaoping:
'Mao and Mediation' Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229 (1997); James U. Feinerman, The
History and Development of China's Dispute Resolution System, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE PRC, Hong Kong, ASIA L. & PRAC. 5 (1995); A. Crawford, Plotting Your Dispute Reso-
lution Strategy: From Negotiating the Dispute Resolution Clause to Enforcement Against Assets,
in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC, Hong Kong, ASIA L. & PRAC. 22 (1995); S. Harpole,
Procedures and Practices Under the China International Economic and Trade Commission, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC, Hong Kong, ASIA L. & PRAC. 51 (1995); S. Finder, Inside
the People's Courts: China's Litigation System and the Resolution of Commercial Disputes, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC, Hong Kong, ASIA L. & PRAC. 63 (1995); and D. Lewis &
K. Ip, Domestic Commercial Arbitration in the People's Republic of China, in DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION IN THE PRC, Hong Kong, ASIA L. & PRAC. 74 (1995).
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however, a difference of perception. Can China still pursue the values it chooses and
integrate at the same time into the global economy? As a totally self-sufficient economy
it rejected global interdependency in the past.
Some Chinese view Western pressure on political ideologies, lifestyles, and values as
an attempt to reinforce Western hegemony and to discipline a rising China. Furthermore,
they believe the spread of a "global culture" has led to a homogenisation of civilizations,
hiding the long-standing struggle for power.44
Therefore, bringing China into the rule-based world trading system might cause a
clash of cultures-with different systems and different objectives having to be accommo-
dated within the context of the WTO and the final act of the Uruguay Round. Indeed,
it may shock the WTO and the multilateral rule-based system at large. 45
In the meantime, China would like to be treated as a special case.46 China, how-
ever, knows that special treatment might come at a discernible cost for other transition
economies or developing country members.47
Countries like Poland, Romania, Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, and former
Yugoslavia received relatively favourable treatment, especially in the IMF and World
Bank. However, they were not always diligent in fulfilling obligations, and at times there
was disappointment in the trade performance of these countries. So, while imports did
not always increase as expected neither did exports increase greatly.48
There is no doubt that involvement in these Bretton Woods institutions noticeably
affects the structures and policies of the member state. Placed in an optimistic perspec-
tive, the interaction between international organisation and state should be reciprocal
and beneficial for all members, hence leading to a more peaceful, stable and equitable
world.
49
Many institutional changes and policy modifications have occurred both within
China and within the IMF and World Bank to facilitate co-operation. It is difficult to
measure the exact influence and sort out the cause and effect, because in the search for
mutual adjustment each international player seeks to protect an image of independence.5 °
As an active member of the IMF and World Bank, China's executive directors and
their deputies have received wide praise for their competence. They have sought to main-
tain the effectiveness of the organisations. They have not been ideological and have not
introduced extraneous political considerations into the debates.5" The Chinese value the
meetings as occasions to broaden their contacts in the international financial community
and to acquire additional knowledge.52
44. See supra text accompanying note 42.
45. See Van der Geest, supra note 12, at 113.
46. By and large, the World Bank and IMF have not treated China as an exceptional case; they
have treated China sympathetically. Instances of special treatment at the margin do exist; but
similar allowances existed for other large developing countries like Egypt and Indonesia. See
JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 21, at 138.
47. See JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 21, at 133. India, for example, has been concerned
that Chinese claims would restrict Indian access to Bank and Fund resources. Id. at 137.
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 129.
51. Id. at 131.
52. Id. at 132.
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China's membership of the IMF and World Bank blunted the charge that they were
instruments of Western imperialism. This has weakened the UNCTAD and strengthened
the present position of the WTO. China's entrance into the Bank has helped other
developing countries look more realistically at development. The debate about the New
International Economic Order has been pushed into the background by the realities of
economic difficulties. Developing countries, therefore, sometimes contend that China
has adopted the rhetoric of the developed world.5 3
Yet, China's role has also been criticised over the years. For example, the McMillan-
Scott report notes that China's participation in multilateral organisations has been very
limited and that its attitude to such bodies has been marked by scepticism.54 In China,
the government's soft policy towards the United States has been criticised over time. 5
Nevertheless, China's involvement in the World Bank and the Bank's involvement in
China today reflect a normal and appropriate partnership between a borrowing member
country and an international institution. 6 China's membership in the IMF and World
Bank has further demonstrated a cautious approach to building a relationship.57
WTO membership for China, however, is quite different from Chinese membership
in the Fund and Bank. The only requirement for China beyond meeting the financial
obligations in its IMF quota and in its subscription to the Bank was the publication
of substantial data. The IMF and World Bank have never been the source of ambi-
tious economic reforms in China, but rather inspired a convergence of views. WTO
membership will therefore be an even larger intellectual and emotional satisfaction.
2. The Road to WTO Accession and Remaining Political Difficulties
The second part of our politico-historical overview closes the circle by zooming into
some of the political issues that are believed to have stood central in China's accession
debate. But before doing so, we turn first to the accession process.
Any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations may accede to the WTO on terms agreed with WTO Member
States. The process of accession begins when a country submits a request for accession. 9
53. Id.
54. See Van der Geest, supra note 12, at 110-11. China's response to this report, prepared by
McMillan-Scott in the European Parliament, 1997, was decidedly negative as it denounced the
debate as "Anti-China clamour." See European Parliament, 1997: Report on the Communication
from the Commission on a Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations (Com (95) 0279-C4-
0288/95) session document A4-040198197, PE 221.588/fin; 29 May 1997.
55. See Wang, supra note 23, at 24-25.
56. See Ling, supra note 36, at 398.
57. See JAcoBsoN & OKSENBERG, supra note 21, at 197 (The authors recognise different stages
in the incorporation process of a member. First, there is the engagement policy followed by
initial participation. Tests of compatibility whether organisation and regular participant can
really join harmoniously occur in the phase of mutual adjustment. This stage is followed by
a mature partnership).
58. Id. at 105.
59. WTO Secretariat, Accession to the World Trade Organization: Procedures for Negotiations
under Article XII, WT/ACC/I (24 March 1995), at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Accession
Procedures]; see also John H. Jackson & Sylvia A. Rhodes, United States Law and China's WTO
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In 1986, after having gained observer status in 1984,60 China applied to join the GATT,61
and in 1987, a working party was established to consider its entry.62 China renewed
its application under the WTO in 1995, when it had missed the opportunity to accept
the WTO Agreement as an original WNTO member state63 and requested that the GATT
working party continue its work as a WTO working party.64
The accession process is conducted at both the multilateral and bilateral level. At
the multilateral level, a working party prepares a Report, Protocol of Accession, and
Schedules of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and Services. The Protocol of
Accession contains the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO. China may accede
to the WTO when both the WTO members, by a two-thirds majority decision, and the
Government of the PRC have accepted the Protocol of Accession. 65
At the bilateral level, negotiations result in market access for all VATO members.
The PRC has been engaged in bilateral market access negotiations with WTO members
Accession Process, J. INT'L ECON. L. 497 (1999). The process of accession can be divided into an
introductory phase of formalities and three substantive phases, including: (1) the applicant's
preparation of a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime describing in detail its policies
and institutions that have a bearing on the conduct of international trade; (2) the members'
fact-finding phase that allows questions and answers; and (3) the negotiation phase. For the
accession process and strategy of transition economies, see C. Michalopoulos, WTO Accession
for Countries in Transition, on file with author. The latest information on China's accession
can also be downloaded from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/china-e.htm. For
the accession procedures under GATT, see G. Patterson, The GATT: Categories, Problems and
Procedures of Membership, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 7 (1992).
60. GATT Activities 1984, at 55 (1985). Before that, the PRC had already been accepted as an
observer to the GATT Textile Committee. By unanimous consent of all Contracting Parties,
China attended the meetings of the GATT Council and other specialised agencies within the
GATT in 1984. See GATT Activities 1983, at 35 (1984). For secondary literature, see Wang,
supra note 23, at 8. See also Y. Feng, China's Membership of GATT: A Practical Proposal, 22
J. WORLD TRADE 53 (1988) (stating that the Chinese government submitted to the GATT
a formal application requesting the restoration of China's status as a Contracting Party in
the organisation on 11 July 1986); Li, supra note 9, at 39 (contending that the Chinese
ambassador in his statement on 17 June 1986 at a GATT Special Council Meeting indicated
that China wished to participate in the Uruguay Round, leading to a Chinese government
communication informing the Contracting Parties of its candidacy on 11 July 1986).
61. See supra note 60 for secondary literature; see also GATT Activities 1986, at 76-77 (1987).
Membership would be negotiated under Article XXXIII of the GATT.
62. See GATT Activities 1986, at 75, 108-09 (1987).
63. Although the PRC wanted to obtain GATT membership in time for it to become an 'original
member' of the WTO, the United States and other WTO members failed to agree on terms
for its entry before the December 1994 deadline. See GATT Activities 1993, at 105 (1994);
see also China Delay on Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at D7.
64. Communication from China, WT/ACC/CHN/1 (7 December 1995) (requesting that the
GATT Working Party on China's Status as a Contracting Party be converted to the Work-
ing Party on China's Accession to the WTO. The WTO General Council agreed). See WTO
Secretariat, General Council (31 January 1995): Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/1 (28 Febru-
ary 1995).
65. See Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 498; Accession Procedures, supra note 59; see also
Eglin, supra note 1.
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on concessions and commitments on goods and services.66 Although these bilateral and
multilateral market access negotiations are well advanced, some political issues remain
unresolved.
a. Taiwan's Bid for WNTO Accession
International organisations are created by states to serve the needs of states. 67 Becom-
ing a member of the WTO is a political decision and for many years international politics
has overshadowed China's membership.
A key factor in China's accession struggle is Taiwan's bid to join the WTO. 61 Since
the early 1980s, the Republic of China, or in short, Taiwan, has been eager to gain
admission to the VTO.69 As for international politics, the entrance of a regime, which
is neither a member of the U.N., nor recognised by most of the world's nations, is
a troubling prospect. 70 But especially, the candidacy of the People's Republic of China
presented a further obstacle.7' The position of Taiwan and its relationship with China 72
became evident again prior to Taiwan's presidential elections in March 1996, when the
Chinese threatened with a military takeover of Taiwan and were launching missiles close
to Taiwan's north and south seaports.
It is only after the PRC will be admitted to the organisation that it is willing to
help Taiwan join under an appropriate name.7'3 Both Hong Kong and Macau became
members of the WTO through the sponsorship of Great Britain and Portugal, after
China consented regarding their respective handover.74 In the case of Taiwan, the PRC
always feared that allowing Taiwan into the WTO would allow it a back door entry as a
recognised member of the world community.
66. See, e.g., Sino-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement of 15 November 1999; Sino-Canada Bilateral
Trade Agreement of 23 November 1999; Sino-EU Bilateral Trade Agreement of 19 May 2000.
67. See L. Fisler Damrosch, GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China and
the Former Soviet Republics, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 19 (1992).
68. Taiwan applied to join the GATT under Article XXXIII in September 1992 as the autonomous
customs territory of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu (referred to as Chinese
Taipei). See GATT Activities 1992, at 95 (1993).
69. See, e.g., Susanna Chan, Taiwan's Application to the GATT: A New Urgency with the Conclusion
of the Uruguay Round, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275 (1994); James V. Feinerman, Taiwan
and the GATT, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 39 (1992).
70. See also THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: LEGAL AND
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS (Henckaerts ed., 1996). This work explains Taiwan's past and
present political and legal positions in the international community. See also L. Chen, Taiwan's
Current International Legal Status, NEW ENG. L. REV. 675 (1998).
71. See the elaborate discussion in W. Cai, China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political
Issues, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 35, 51 (1992).
72. On the relationship between China and Taiwan, see C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute:
What Role for Normalizing Relations between China and Taiwan, NEW ENG. L. REV. 819
(1998).
73. The PRC is afraid to lose face in its 'one China policy' if Taiwan were to become a member
first.
74. Macau was granted full membership of the GATT on 11 January 1991 and Hong Kong on
23 April 1986. See Cai, supra note 71, at 37.
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Moreover, China was a founding member of GATT 1947. It participated in the
negotiations in 1947, and became a party to the Protocol of Provisional Application,
which came into force in 1948. In the aftermath of the October 1949 Communist coup,
the government of the Republic of China, from its new home base in Taiwan, gave notice
of withdrawal from the GATT in 1950. The PRC does not acknowledge this withdrawal,
but neither did it contest the legality at the relevant time, in the 1950s, nor did the PRC
observe the obligations of membership from the 1950s onward.75 This historical event
created the difference over China's accession rather than its resumption of membership.
In sum, this matter has become a diplomatic trifle,76 because GATT 1947 has lost much
of its relevance since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and GATT 1947 was replaced
by GATT 1994.
As of this writing, China still continues to negotiate to enter the WTO, whereas
Taiwan's Protocol of Accession was substantially completed in May 1999."7
b. Human Rights Issues
Since 1989, there have been pressing demands on China to improve its human rights
record. Western economic powers consider a fair and open society as one of the premises
the WTO is built upon. Some legal scholars therefore propose a "single basket approach"
linking all political and economic dealings with China to human rights.78
The Tiananmen massacre in June 198979 left some wounds in the political relation-
ships with major trade powers.8 0 The United States had negotiated some of its bilateral
terms for the PRC 's accession to the GATT, but withdrew its support for accession after
the June protests, and the June meeting of the working party was cancelled due to the
75. See, e.g., Fisler Damrosch, supra note 67, at 21; see also John H. Jackson, The World Trading
System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 329 (1997); A. Neil Tait & Kui-Wai
Li, Trade Regimes and China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, 31 1. WORLD TRADE
93, 98 (1997).
76. See Fisler Damrosch, supra note 67, at 23. Membership must be examined de novo, but no
harm will be done if the WTO members defer to Beijing's insistence on the term "resump-
tion."
77. See Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 501.
78. See, e.g., Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic
Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'y 1 (1996) (she proposes that the multilateral enforcement of human rights should be
made possible through the investigative and dispute settlement procedures already in place
within the WTO); see also Randal Green, Human Rights and MFN Tariff Rates for Products
from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET L. REV. 611 (1994); Diane Orentlicher &
Timothy Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors
in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66 (1993); Jennifer Morris, Human Rights Violations
During the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the Precedents Obliging United States Response,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1375 (1991).
79. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Troops Attack and Crash Beijing Protest; Thousands Fight Back,
Scores are Killed, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1989, at Al.
80. On the U.S. response, see Morris, supra note 78. See also Matthew W. Cheney, Trading with
the Dragon: A Critique of the Use of Sanctions by the United States against China, 8 J. INT'L L. &
PRAC. 1 (1997).
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political upheaval."1 The EC also condemned the Chinese Government's suppression of
the pro-democracy demonstration.
8 2
But already in September 1989 GATT decided to resume consideration of the
Chinese accession, and the working party met in December of that year. 3 By 1992,
foreign investment was roaring again and, following a period of inactivity, the working
party resumed its task in February 1992.84
c. Ideological Differences: United States Law
Because of the ideological differences that exist between the capitalist West and
the communist East, U.S. statutes sometimes still constrain the ability to enter into a
commercial agreement with a non-market economy.8 1 In respect to China's accession,
these statutes come into play as well. Theoretically, China could become a member of
the WTO without the support of the United States as soon as a two-thirds majority
approves the accession. 6 But even if the United States voted in favour of China's entry,
it would have to opt out and could not simply extend permanent, unconditional most-
favoured-nation treatment to the PRC. 7
Pursuant to Title IV of the 1974-enacted Trade Act, it is required that the U.S. Pres-
ident denies non-discriminatory treatment to products of any country whose products
were not eligible for such treatment on January 3, 1975.88 It involved products of com-
munist countries that deny its citizens the right to emigrate, or impose conditions on
81. Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 500; see Robert S. Ross, Enter the Dragon, 104 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 18, 22 (1996); see also Chan, supra note 69, at 279; Feinerman, supra note 69, at 43
(both mention that the student massacre in June 1989 caused a setback in the WTO accession
negotiations). Cai, supra note 71, at 35-36 (who noting that due to the June 1989 political
disturbance the Uruguay Round did not become a success for the Chinese). Nonetheless,
the GATT Working Party on China's Accession had reached a relatively advanced stage. See
GATT Activities 1989, at 130 (1990).
82. On 6 June 1989, the then 12 Member States issued a joint statement of condemnation. See EC
Bull. 6-1989, point 2.4.1. During the Madrid Summit in the same month, the EC announced
sanctions against China. The United States, Japan, and other industrialised countries acted
likewise.
83. Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 500; GATT Activities 1989, at (1990); see also GATT
Weighs China's Entry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1989, at D2.
84. GATT Activities 1992, at 94 (1993).
85. Particularly useful in this regard are Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, and Taunya L.
McLarty, MFN Relations with Communist Countries: Is the Two-Decade Old System Working,
or Should It Be Revised or Repealed? 33 RICH. L. REV. 153 (Mar. 1999). See also BEYOND
MFN-TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie
eds., 1994).
86. See Joseph J. Borich, China, the WTO, and Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China,
CHINAONLINE, Mar. 24, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com (noting that China's bid to join
the WTO is now on its own trajectory, and cannot be blocked by U.S. legislative action).
87. The United States would be obliged to invoke the "non-application" clause of WTO Article
XIII, and China would certainly reciprocate.
88. See Trade Act of 1974 §401, 19 U.S.C. §2431 (1994). According to the legislative his-
tory of section 401, non-discriminatory treatment should be denied to the products
of communist countries except Poland and Yugoslavia. S. Rep. No. 93-1293 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7333. The following countries were ineligible to
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emigration. Section 402, the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, contains a complicated
scheme for determining when the United States will grant non-discriminatory treatment
to communist countries. In 1998, the term 'most-favoured-nation treatment: which was
interchangeably used with the term non-discriminatory treatment, was changed to 'nor-
mal trade relations t s9
Under Jackson-Vanik, the President may extend normal trade relations status to
the PRC only if the PRC permits free emigration. It requires him to submit a report
to Congress twice a year certifying that the PRC is in full compliance with the free-
dom of emigration requirements. The President may waive the freedom of emigration
requirements if he determines that the PRC is making certain progress toward the goal
of free emigration. Presidential waivers are subject to a joint resolution of disapproval by
the two Houses of Congress. The President can veto the joint resolution, but Congress
has the authority to override it. To override, each House must vote such action by a
two-thirds vote. 90
Following the 1979 U.S.-China bilateral trade agreement, the United States first
granted MFN treatment in 1980, and extended it every year since. The issue became
controversial, however, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. President Bush con-
tinued to renew MFN treatment altogether.9' In 1993, Bill Clinton, a critic of the Bush
administration, renewed MFN treatment and declared his intent to link MFN status to
improvements in the PRC's human rights performance. Despite some views that progress
on human rights was limited, President Clinton renewed MFN again in 1994. At the
same time, his Administration announced the intention to break the link between MFN
treatment and human rights issues. 92
After passing through the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, an historic




Previous sections of this article have demonstrated some of the many political con-
cerns raised by Western powers in terms of China's WTO accession. They have shown the
material and psychological sufferings of China in the past and its concern for reciprocity
in trade relations, how the global economy dominates international law and relations,
receive non-discriminatory treatment: Albania, Bulgaria, the PRC, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, those parts of Indochina under communist control or
domination, North Korea, the Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Romania,
Southern Sakhalin, Tanna Tuva, Tibet and the USSR. Id.
89. Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 502-03.
90. Id. at 503.
91. Determination No. 90-21, 55 Fed. Reg. 23, 183 (1990).
92. Jackson & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 504.
93. See Clinton Signs PNTR Bill into Law, supra note 1. See C. Fred Bergsten, The Next Trade
Policy Battle, International Economics Policy Briefs, January 2000, at www.iie.com; Gary Glyde
Hufbauer & Daniel H. Rosen, American Access to China's Market: The Congressional Vote on
PNTR, International Economics Policy Briefs, April 2000, at www.iie.com; see also Charles
Snyder, PNTR Given Green Light by U.S. Senate, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Sept. 19, 2000, at
www.chinaonline.com.
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and how cautious Western powers are to engage in relationships with China. They have
also taught us that the accession process is foremost a political event, and not a legal or
economic one.
While there is controversy about the degree of Chinese adherence to international
agreements, it is clear that a mixed and somewhat improving picture is the norm.
Notably, Chinese compliance with sovereign treaties and agreements is superior to
enforcement of commercial agreements between private parties.94 It would therefore
definitely be premature to conclude that China would not be able to fulfill its role as a
constructive member of the world trading system.
Undoubtedly, China's accession to the WTO is an event of great political significance,
nonetheless that negotiations at times were tough (e.g., because of NATO's bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the U.S. Congressional report on
Chinese espionage regarding U.S. nuclear missile technology).9" Entry into the WTO is
foremost a political decision. Parts B and C of this article, however, will explore whether
China can comply economically and legally.
B. ESTABLISHING A MARKET ECONOMY AND VVTO COMPLIANCE
The previous sections dealt with issues that are almost exclusively political and/or
procedural and had nothing to do with the substantive economic concerns that WTO
membership requires. Because WTO membership impacts on so many different areas
of economic activity, profound reforms are necessary to implement the delicate policy
decisions surrounding it.
It is here also that much controversy over China's accession exists. China is asked to
demonstrate with these reforms how it intends to meet the existing WTO provisions. It
is this author's opinion that significant delays have occurred in China's accession because
members' fact finding about Chinese policies merges into the negotiations about how
existing policies need to be changed to ensure conformity with the WTO.
China's admission ticket is complex, reflecting the intersection of the interests and
concerns of both policy makers in China and in current WTO members. Instead of
reviewing the widespread reductions in protection, the opening up of a wide range of
sectors, and to represent the accession simply as a move to free trade, this part establishes
the inextricable link of China's trade regime with the reform of the state-enterprise sector
to allow indirect regulation through market-determined prices and to replace direct
regulation of enterprise output through the planning system. 96
To this end, we will discuss the foreign trade regime in China, then zoom into
the reforms of its state-owned enterprises (SOE) and finally discuss the compliance of
Chinese SOE reform with Articles XVII GATT and VIII GATS. These Articles both
94. I can refer here to recent research by James Feinerman and Daniel Chang, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, Washington D.C. (Chinese Practice of International Law in the Post-Mao
Era). See also Hufbauer & Rosen, supra note 93.
95. See, e.g., Gary Hutbauer & Daniel Rosen, Spies, Bombs, and the WTO, at www.iie.com/
TESTMONY/Spies.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2000).
96. That a link between state enterprise reform and China's trade regime exists is proven by
Elena lanchovichina, Will Martin, and Emiko Fukase, World Bank, Assessing the Implications
of Merchandise Trade Liberalization in China's Accession to WTO, 23 June 2000.
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address the concerns raised by a large state presence in the economy and the possible
negative impacts on the multilateral trading system. The important struggle of transition
economies to bring their large state sectors in line with WTO market requirements
explains this narrow scope.
1. State Trading and Article XVII GATT
Article XVII GATT addresses the concerns that State trading raises. However, its
provisions are not rigorous. Article XVII only tackles the problem by requiring notifica-
tion97 and the supply of information.9 It does not prevent any member from establish-
ing or maintaining State enterprises, but it demands that such enterprises shall respect
non-discriminatory treatment 99 and take into account commercial considerations.' 00 The
serious obstacles to trade, which these enterprises can create, must therefore be limited
in negotiations to expand international trade.'0 '
Article XVII makes an important exception for government procurement, 0 2 which
is addressed separately in the relevant plurilateral agreement.'0 3 The U.S.-China Bilateral
WTO Agreement, however, explicitly clarifies that purchases of goods or services by state-
owned and state-invested enterprises are not government procurement and thus subject
to Article XVII and WTO rules."°M
97. See § 4(a) of Article XVII. Members must notify all products thdt are imported or exported by
state enterprises. On this notification requirement, see also GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE
TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE (1995), 481-82, and the Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XVII of GATT 1994, which tries to improve notification. Notification is done through
an established questionnaire.
98. See § 4(b), (c), (d) of Article XVII.
99. According to the GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, this involves only MFN and no National Treat-
ment (p. 475, referring to early Geneva discussions). Recent case law from 1984 and 1988
did not answer the issue decisively. See 1984 "Canada-Administration of the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act," L/5504, adopted on 7 February 1984, 30S/140, 163, para. 5.16; and 1988
"Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Mar-
keting Agencies" L/6304, adopted on 22 March 1988, 35S/37, 90, para. 4.27.
100. Like price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, etc. The idea is to afford enter-
prises of other members to compete for participation. See § 1(b) of Article XVII.
101. See §3 of Article XVII.
102. See § 2 of Article XVII (stating that paragraph 1 shall not apply to imports of products for
immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use).
103. The Agreement on Government Procurement, 1994, does not come under the single package
of WTO accession and applies only to parties that explicitly have ratified the agreement.
For further reference on government procurement and China, see Robert F. Dodds, Offsets
in Chinese Government Procurement: The Partially Open Door, 26 L. & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus.
1119 (1995); John Linarelli, China and the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, 8
J. CHINESE L. 185 (1994). On government procurement in transition economies, see also
Sam Laird, Transition Economies, Business and the WTO, WTO, May 1998.
104. See Sino-U.S. Bilateral WTO Agreement, 15 November 1999. It must further be noted that
accession to the WTO by nonmarket economies that have State-trading practices is addressed
in the U.S. 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107. Section 1106 provides that before any major country with significant State-trading
enterprises can enter, the U.S. President must determine whether trade between the United
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The central concern for our purposes here is that the Chinese government could act
in indirect ways to influence world trade in an uneconomic direction. Acting through
State enterprises, it could provide protection against imports or to advance exports, to
the detriment of foreign producers. Bringing these State enterprises within the realm of
private industry competition is therefore the main focus. In other words, State enterprises
must learn how to behave as private competitive traders.
The most prominent negative effects of uncontrolled State trading are violations of
market access obligations and the use of proprietary directions to evade the elimination
of quantitative measures. The disciplines on State trading are contained in other articles
of GATT. Market access can be harmed by setting resale prices of imports at very high
levels, and so negate tariff concessions bound in WTO Schedules conforming Article II
GATT.' The other prominent effect, the creation of quantitative restraints, is addressed
in Interpretative Notes to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII. Governments might
abuse ownership in enterprises to give directions that limit the amount of trade and
thereby protect the domestic market without having to issue trade-distorting legislation.
In doing so, governments create quantitative restrictions.1
0 6
It is a nuisance that for its purposes Article XVII does not define 'State-trading
enterprises.' But it is clear from the text that various types of enterprises come within
its scope: (1) a 'State enterprise' or 'any enterprise' that has been granted 'formally
or in effect, exclusive or special privileges' (paragraph l(a)); (2) 'Marketing Boards'
(interpretative note to paragraph 1); (3) 'any enterprise' under the jurisdiction of a
contracting party (paragraph 1(c)); and an 'import monopoly' (paragraph 4(b))."°7
A clarification of what is considered to be a state-trading enterprise for notifica-
tion purposes is provided in the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XVII. Members shall notify state-trading enterprises in accordance with the following
working definition: "Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including mar-
keting boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including
statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports:' °8
States and that country is significant, and if the trade unduly burdens the United States. If
so, WTO rules will apply only if the State trading is conducted on a commercial basis.
105. See John H. Jackson, State Trading and Nonmarket Economies, 23 INT'L LAW. 891, 892 (1989).
Even if there is a tariff binding for the product in question, a markup could effectively evade
the tariff binding. After all, the provision of Article II, section § 4 (in case of monopolised
state trading) is hard to police, and furthermore many products could be unbound anyway.
106. See Laird, supra note 103 (noting that state-trading countries and state-trading enterprises
are perceived as making purchasing and sales decisions that need not be determined on the
bases of the best price for equal quality of products or services, duplicating the effects of
quantitative restrictions); see also Jackson, supra note 105, at 892 (noting that Article XI can
easily be evaded by proprietary directions from the State owner).
107. The Working Party on State trading is developing an illustrative list showing the kinds of
relationships between governments and State trading enterprises, and the kinds of activities
engaged in by these enterprises.
108. Citation from Raj Bhala, International Trade Law-Documents Supplement, Charlottesville,
Michie, 1996, at 97.
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Even without a clear definition of what constitutes a State enterprise,"°9 it is clear
that Chinese SOEs come under the umbrella of Article XVII and must be scrutinised for
their uneconomic behaviour. This requires first some knowledge about the foreign trade
system in China.
2. China's Foreign Trade System"'
China's trade system is unusually strict because Chinese law imposes limitations on
the capacity of Chinese enterprises to engage in foreign trade. Only those enterprises
that have permission from the government are qualified to import or export goods. The
ability to enter into foreign trade contracts is proscribed by an agency system"' and
complicated procedures exist to license" 2 Chinese businesses to legally contract with
foreigners." 3 The rationale justifying these restraints on foreign trade is the necessity to
maintain order in the Chinese foreign trade system." 4
There exists a whole range of Foreign Trade Operators (FTO) permitted to con-
duct import and export business, but apart from Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIE)
and maybe Sino-Foreign Investment Foreign Trade Corporations (SFIFTC), the bulk of
trading companies remain state-owned or involve state capital. These entities comprise
National Foreign Trade Corporations (NFTC) and Local Foreign Trade Corporations
(LFTC), Production Enterprises with Foreign Trade Rights (PEFTR), Commercial and
109. The U.S. Draft Charter of GATT 1947 contained a definition of State enterprise in the section
on State trading: "For the purposes of this Article, a State enterprise shall be understood to be
any enterprise over whose operations a Member government exercises, directly or indirectly,
a substantial measure of control." For further reference, see GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX 473.
110. Substantial economic research concerning the reform of the foreign trade system was done by
NICHOLAS R. LARDY, FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA, 1978-1990 (1991)
and Thomas Y. Man, National Legal Restructuring in Accordance with International Norms:
GATT/WTO and China's Foreign Trade Reform, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 471 (1997).
111. Under this system a Foreign Trade Corporation (FTC) enters into a contractual relationship
directly with a production enterprise or other entity to serve as its agent in conducting
purchasing and selling in the international market. The FTC will sign on behalf of the entity
and charge a commission, but the principal will bear the responsibility of all of the profits
and losses of the transaction. See PRC, Foreign Trade Law (FTL), 12 May 1994, art. 13; see
also Bing Wang, China's New Foreign Trade Law: Analysis and Implications for China's GATT
Bid, 28 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 495, 505-06 (1995).
112. Art. 9 FTL, supra note 11; see Wang, supra note 111, at 502 (also dealing with import and
export licensing). Apart from a positive list for trading companies, there also exists a negative
list for commodities that these companies can trade. The negative list is used to reserve a list
of commodities for trading by specified enterprises. Firms wishing to trade in other products
are required to be on a positive list of firms with trading rights for those particular goods.
See lanchovichina et al., supra note 96.
113. The sanction is that parties end up with a void, thus unenforceable, contract if the Chinese
contracting party has no FTR. See M. Williams & J. Zhong, The Capacity of Chinese Enterprises
to Engage in Foreign Trade: Does Restriction Help or Hinder China's Trade Relations? 8 J. TRANS.
L. & PoL'Y 197, 217 (1999).
114. Williams & Zhong, supra note 113, at 197-98 (further arguing that this system does not
support an orderly trade system but rather sustains disorder, leading to the separation of
these enterprises from international markets).
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Material Enterprises with Foreign Trade Rights (CMEFTR), and Science Research Insti-
tutes with Foreign Trade Rights (SRIFTR).1 5
This diversification of FTOs is a recent phenomenon and definitely indicates that
China is gradually releasing its tight hold on the capacity of Chinese enterprises to
engage in foreign trade. In this regard, a 1984 landmark report from the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) ended the thirty-year monopoly
over foreign trade by NFTC and LFTC." 6 It has, therefore, become possible for a wider
spectrum of Chinese enterprises to get actively involved in international competition.
Recently, China has begun an experimental registration system in several Special Eco-
nomic Zones (SEZ). The partial replacement of the licensing system, however, does not
indicate that China's practice fully reflects the principle of free trade.1 7
An important aspect of China's foreign trade system reform was the grant of Foreign
Trade Rights (FTR) to individual SOEs. These SOEs were traditionally separated from
international markets."' Thus, neither could they directly import what they needed
for their production, nor export what they produced until the 1984 MOFTEC report
changed this. Today, large and medium SOEs are qualified to apply for FTR." 9 But,
the departments in charge of foreign trade must consider applications according to a
115. See Williams & Zhong, supra note 113, at 203.
116. The full text appeared in A Collection of Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui Huibian) (Law Department of the General Office of the
State Council of the PRC ed., 1986). The report concluded that SFTC would remain the
principal force of foreign trade; they should, however, not enjoy a monopoly over foreign
trade operations. MOFTEC therefore recommended that a limited number of small- and
medium-sized enterprises should be allowed to enter the market as complementary traders
to revitalise China's foreign trade. See Williams & Zhong, supra note 113, at 201. Further-
more, it should be noted that around the same time, MOFTEC had approved a profound
decentralisation of foreign trade authority. In the beginning only twelve NFTC existed. By the
mid 1980s national production ministries created their own FTCs, and secondly provincial
governments established hundreds of FTCs. See Lardy, supra note 110, at 39 (noting also that
the monopoly position eroded slowly since 1981). On decentralisation and the two-tiered
foreign trade management, see also Wang, supra note 111, at 497.
117. Williams & Zhong, supra note 113, at 198-99.
118. While prices in international markets continue to respond to changes in supply and demand,
China's price structure appears to have diverged increasingly over time from world prices.
See Lardy, supra note 110, at 20 (who calls it an "airlock" system, id. at 41).
119. See State Council, Regulations on Transformation of the Operating Mechanism of the
State-owned Industrial Enterprises (1992) (Transformation Regulations); State Council,
Opinions of Granting Production Enterprises Foreign Trade Rights (FTR Opinion); see also
MOFTEC and State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), Joint Circular on Further
Promoting the Work of Granting the Production Enterprises FTR (Joint Circular), Jan.
30, 1997. Similar requirements exist for CMEFTR. See State Council, Opinion on Exper-
imentally Granting FTR to CME (CME Opinion), Nov. 4, 1993. CMEs are differentiated
because they deal either with consumer goods or extractive products, petro-chemical prod-
ucts, and mechanical and electrical equipment. See Williams & Zhong, supra note 113,
at 207-11.
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certain order of priority.12° Further, the application for FTR cannot be approved unless a
number of administrative conditions are fulfilled. 2 ' Additional requirements exist when
the applicant is a local production enterprise.'22
The reform process gradually increased both the numbers of firms allowed to trade
and the different types of firms eligible for trading rights. Moreover, the traditional
State-trading enterprises or FTCs have been awarded independent legal status, and SOEs
of this type now appear to operate very strongly along commercial lines.'23 Consumers
and producers wishing to purchase imports or sell exports will typically have a range of
enterprises through which they can undertake these transactions.
However, State trading goes beyond the operation of traditional FTC-monopolised
trade. It also encompasses the production and commercial SOEs. Either because the
Chinese government directly controls the enterprise through ownership, or because the
FTR grants it through a complex administrative licensing system, a special privilege is
created.'24 Therefore, SOEs, which have been granted FTR, undoubtedly come within
the realm of Article XVII of GATT.
What we should remember from this section is that the administrative licensing of
the capacity to engage in foreign trade still seals off SOEs from international markets, and
competition insofar as the commercial decision-making is preoccupied by administrative
120. See FTR Opinion, supra note 119, art. 1. First come priority enterprises, i.e., technology
intensive enterprises or enterprises, which produce machinery and electrical equipment and
need to provide after-sale services abroad or enterprises that produce and export machinery
and electrical equipment. Second come strictly-controlled enterprises, which are enterprises
mainly producing primary materials, products subject to quota control, or products with
only a single market. Third are the. flexibly-controlled enterprises, which are granted by
evaluating the nature of demand and supply in both domestic and international markets
if the enterprises do not produce machinery or electrical products but rather technology-
intensive products or products with a short commercial life span. Finally there is a category
of disqualified enterprises, which shall not be granted FTR, including core enterprises in
an enterprise group that has been granted FTR, large SOE groups that have established a
subsidiary specialising in import and export operations, or enterprises which have joined any
export combine or joint export corporation.
121. See Joint Circular, supra note 119, § 1. An application for FTR cannot be granted unless the
enterprise is (a) an independent economic entity, which enjoys the autonomy to manage
and has separated its business form administration by government; (b) has its own premises
and facilities for operations, funds, and other materials necessary for import and export
operations; (c) has personnel qualified for foreign trade operations; and (d) produces its
own products for export and meets the set export value. However, as of January 1997, the
set export value requirement no longer applies to large SOEs. See Williams & Zhong, supra
note 113, at 209.
122. See FTR Opinion, supra note 119, arts. 3, 4.
123. lanchovichina et al., supra note 96.
124. It is considered that the government conferring the exclusive or special privileges should
assume the responsibility of exercising effective control over operations affecting the external
trade of such enterprise. See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX 473 (based on the London report of
the Preparatory Committee).
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decision-making. 2 ' Besides, the licensing of FTR is also a form of quantitative restriction
of trade; insofar it still can restrict the number of FTOs. 26 And finally, the numerical
surge of FTOs and the differential treatment amongst them erodes the uniformity in
which foreign trade should be administered."'
In a moment, we will return to the concerns of Article XVII of GATT, but first,
the following section will shed light on the continuing SOE reform to further establish
whether SOEs are capable of independent commercial decision making in view of Article
XVII GATT.
3. State-Owned Enterprise Reform
SOEs are, in belief and fact, the backbone of the Chinese economy. These enterprises
produce a variety of products and do involve more than heavy industry. The state sector
is a major institution affecting millions directly and the entire population indirectly. The
SOEs feed, clothe, and tend from cradle to grave a large portion of the population, and
its products and revenues provided to the state benefit the entire population.
Increasing the number and type of enterprises eligible to conduct foreign trade,
developing the indirect trade policy instruments that were absent or unimportant under
the planning system, reducing and removing the exchange rate distortion, and reforming
prices to allow the creation of a market, are all linked with SOE reform. To understand
the difficulties of establishing a market economy along commercial lines as a prerequisite
to WTO membership, SOE reform is discussed in more detail below.
a. Initial Reform
From the foundation of the People's Republic in 1949 to the inauguration of the
Economic Reform and Open Door policy in 1978, the economy was based on pub-
lic ownership.'28 Apart from state ownership, there was also state management regu-
lating all personnel, finance, physical assets, production, supply, and marketing affairs
under the guidance of centralised state plans.1 2 9 Therefore, the enterprises did not enjoy
125. Williams & Zhong, supra note 113, at 228. The strict control on the capacity of enterprises to
engage in foreign trade has led to the separation of enterprises from international markets,
and, consequently, their ignorance of international practices and rules.
126. Wang, supra note 111, at 504-05.
127. Id. at 521-22.
128. See Q. Jiang, Like Wading Across a Stream: Law, Reform and the State Enterprise, in COM-
MERCIAL LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: REGULATION AND REFORM AFFECTING
THE MARKET I (Bachner & Fu eds., 1975). By 1978, the public sector was responsible for
98 percent of the GNP and accounted for almost 100 percent of the industrial output, of
which 77.6 percent was produced by SOEs and 22.4 percent by other Collectively-Owned
Enterprises (COE) in the economy.
129. In a traditional command economy the state is viewed as one giant vertically integrated pro-
ductive firm: "China Inc.' See Donald D. Clarke, Regulation and Its Discontents: Understanding
Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 287 (1992) [hereinafter Clark (1992)]. At the
top of the system stood the State Planning Commission (SPC). The SPC set initial rough
targets, then sent to various industrial ministries under the State Council and to provincial
planning commissions. The ministries and provinces then disaggregated these targets and
added requirements of their own before passing them on to particular enterprises. See also
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independent legal status nor did they have any autonomous decision-making power. 3'
It must be noted, however, that China's highly centralised command economy was not
as rigid as its supermodel in the neighbouring Soviet Union. 3 ' While the plan played
a major role in the national economy, the state had begun to supplement it by market
adjustments by the end of the 1970s.
The liberalisation of the agricultural economy was the first systematic effort to incor-
porate market forces into the Chinese economy.3 ' It allowed farmers to provide food
products that the agricultural markets were demanding. In addition, the first step for
enterprise reform had to readjust the management relationship between the state and
the enterprise by delegating independent management authority to and sharing profits
with the enterprise.'33
b. Main Approaches
The reform strategy that has been implemented is best described as a gradual dual-
track approach'34 (shuang gui zhi), characterised by the coexistence of a 'new' market
track ' and an 'old' plan track.'36 It caused some ideological difficulty to legitimise
Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in
China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Clark (1991)J; Robert F. Dodds, State
Enterprise Reform in China: Managing the Transition to a Market Economy, 27 LAW & PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 695, 704-05 (1996).
130. See Jiang, supra note 128, at 2; see also Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated:
The First Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 277
(1995). Decision power rested with the Department in Charge, the so-called mother-in-law
of the enterprise. Factory managers were responsible to the relevant ministry's bureaucracy.
According to enterprise guidelines set out in the Seventy Policy Points for State Industries,
promulgated September 1961, the duty of the enterprise was strictly limited to the fulfilment
of the task quotas stipulated by the state plans.
131. See Clarke (1992), supra note 129, at 287; Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 6.
132. See Jiang, supra note 128, at 2; see also David Blumental, 'Reform' or 'Opening'? Reform
of China's State-owned Enterprises and WTO Accession-The Dilemma of Applying GATT to
Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 198, 228 (1998). Reform spread rapidly
from the few areas in Anhui and Sichuan provinces; the Party leaders from those provinces,
Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang, were soon thereafter promoted to central leadership positions.
133. Agriculture was essentially decollectivised, with each household making its own decisions on
production. See Clarke (1992), supra note 129, at 285-86. About rural collectives, see Dodds,
supra note 129, at 701, and about agricultural reform see id at 706.
134. See Y. Cao et al., Chinese Economic Reforms: Past Successes and Future Challenges, in
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION-COMPARING AsIA AND EASTERN EUROPE 20 (Wing Woo et al.
eds., 1997). This dual-track approach pervades almost every aspect of policy making. One
encounters it in sectoral reform, price deregulation, enterprise restructuring, regional devel-
opment, trade promotion, foreign exchange management, central-local fiscal arrangements,
and domestic currency issuance. See also Nicholas Lardy, China's Unfinished Economic Revo-
lution (1998) (analysing China's Economic Reform Strategy).
135. The 'new' track is the non-state sector, which consists of private and semi-private enterprises,
community-owned rural industrial enterprises, and foreign joint ventures or wholly foreign-
owned enterprises.
136. The 'old' track consists of the state sector.
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profit-seeking private enterprises. 137 But, as a result of the reforms the private, new track
economy soon started to supplement the state industry. Today, large numbers of private
medium and small businesses operate in China's economy. 3  The Chinese government
now even encourages individuals and private firms to buy smaller SOEs to become full
owners. Usually it concerns enterprises the government deems itself unable to manage. 39
This obviously has an impact on competition as well. °
Gradualism was adopted not because there were no proposals for more radical
reforms, but because at the end of the 1970s most ordinary people had not yet totally
lost their trust in the old system.' 4' It was popularly believed that the economic problems
came from the implementation of the political struggle'42 and not from the defects of
the central planning system. Gradualism was more of an ex post facto description of an
unintended evolutionary process.
43
137. Because private business conflicts with socialist ideology, it was resolved by distinguishing
at first between "individual" enterprises (geti jingii) and "private" enterprises (siying jingii).
The former are essentially based on a person's own labour and may employ a few workers
without really changing its nature; the latter, however, relied on hired labour and hence raised
issues of worker exploitation. In 1987, the then General Secretary of the party, Zhao Ziyang,
advanced the notion that China was in the "primary stage of socialism." This means that in
a predominant public sector, the private sector may contribute production and employment.
See Art & Gu, supra note 130, at 286 and Blumental, supra note 132, at 221. Last author
therefore calls China "a strange hybrid in which diverse forms of ownership coexist, often in
tension with each other." See also Dodds, supra note 128, at 703-04.
138. See Most of China Economy Not State-Owned, International Finance Corp. Says, CHINAONLINE
NEWS, Oct. 26, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com. This requires also new law reforms. See
One Size Does Not Fit All: New Laws Tailored for Private Sector, CH!NAONLINtF NEWS, Oct.
18, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com (noting that China will draft new business laws to
fit private enterprises).
139. These enterprises mainly fall into three categories: enterprises that are insolvent or near
bankruptcy; businesses suffering from losses or earning only minimal profits over an extended
term; or those selected for sale "to perfect the structure of industry." See Art & Gu, supra
note 130, at 287.
140. Regarding the structure of the market in China, see Bing Song, Competition Policy in a
Transitional Economy: The Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387 (1995). See also Dodds,
supra note 133, who notes that large numbers of rural workers were able to leave farming to
set up small private businesses and to work in township and village enterprises. They began
to compete with the SOEs for investment, goods and funds, which caused the latter's profits
to decline. The increase in agricultural prices also eroded SOE profits and caused the urban
costs of living to rise.
141. Cao et al., supra note 134, at 31. Authors note that the majority of the society and the
leadership in 1978 were not in favour of a radical reform package because the economic
situation then was improving rapidly.
142. Crucial here was the end of the decade-long Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping returned
quickly to power after the ultra-leftist Gang of Four was arrested by Mao's would-be successor
Hua Guofeng, hereby ending the Cultural Revolution. Groundbreaking herein was the Com-
muniqu6 of the Third Plenary Session in late December 1978. See Blumental, supra note 132,
at 226.
143. Cao et al., supra note 134, at 31. Authors note that very few people knew what to do in 1978.
Participants might have known what the first "piece" should be, but might not know what the
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Politics still is at the centre of gradualism. The transition to a market-oriented econ-
omy invariably produces dislocation and social stress, causing uncertainty and discontent.
The possibility of unrest'" is a political problem for the Chinese government, which
fears massive restructuring will have devastating political consequences for the Party
bureaucracy. 14 The lack of political willingness to carry out painful reforms of ineffi-
cient, unprofitable enterprises has caused China's marketisation efforts to stagnate. 146
Notwithstanding China's commitment to reform and integration, Jiang Zemin
emphasised that maintaining political stability is of primary importance. 47 Because of
the political risks 41 involved, China hesitates to implement far-reaching and necessary
economic reforms. 49 A considerable number of reformers in the PRC still believe in the
old track economy and that it should be revitalised. As long as economic policies are
geared to regime survival of the communist elite, however, China will have a difficult
time convincing WTO members that it can uphold commitments to open its services
sector, give away market share to foreign investors, further lower tariff bindings, to
eliminate licensing requirements and other Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB).
Apart from these political consequences, gradualism raises the issue of whether the
two tracks should be merged as rapidly as possible.' The state has used the revenue
next one should be. They also note the absence of a common vision at the elite level. China's
gradual reform has been characterised by gradual changing of its reform objectives. China
has proceeded through a lengthy path of readjusting its reform objectives from "a planned
economy with some market adjustment," to "a combination of plan and market" and now to
"a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics." The last vision having apparently
resolved the issue. See also DALI YANG, CALAMITY AND REFORM IN CHINA-STATE, RURAL
SOCIETY, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE SINCE THE GREAT LEAP FAMINE (1998) (arguing that
next to the role of plans by revisionist leadership and the Cultural Revolution rural reforms
incubating later reforms, are also due to the Great Leap Famine).
144. For example, after a trial bankruptcy experiment of a large state-owned knitting mill in
Chongqing, 2,000 laid-off workers marched on City Hall in protest and government lead-
ers were only able to avoid riots by going to extraordinary lengths to reassign workers to
other jobs. See Dodds, supra note 128, at -723; see also Junhua Wu, The Problem of Social
Inequality Confronting China in the New Millennium, CHINAONLINE NEWS, May 18, 2000,
at http://www.chinaonline.com; Oliver August, 5,000 Chinese Protest over Unpaid Wages, THE
TIMES, May 18, 2000.
145. See Blumental, supra note 132, at 202.
146. Id. at 209.
147. At the 15th Party Congress, Jiang stated "[l]t is of the utmost importance to maintain a
stable political environment and public order (... ). We must uphold the leadership of the
Party (...) eliminate all factors jeopardising stability, and guard against ... ) subversive
(...) domestic hostile forces." Id. at 216.
148. See V. Chan, Exterminate Foes of Reform: Jiang-President Tries to Balance 'Leftists' and
Rightists,' SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 23, 2000; Jin-Kyu Joung, Zhu Rongi Pushes
China to an East European-Style Moment of Truth, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Aug. 23, 2000, at
http://www.chinaonline.com (both noting a dangerous political conflict in China between
pro-reform and conservative forces).
149. Like implementing the Bankruptcy Law. See infra note 154.
150. See Cao et al., supra note 134, at 32; Lardy, supra note 134, at 3. He notes that the economic
cost of postponing fundamental transformation of the state sector is overlooked. On the
pace of reforms, see also V. Thomas & Y. Wang, East Asian Lessons from Economic Reforms,
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from the more productive new sectors not only to cover the losses of the SOEs in the old
sector but also to upgrade these SOEs. The result is that the old track has not shrunk
proportionately as rapidly as it should have. The most important challenge is not how
to speed up the growth of the new track, but how to ensure that the old track does not
grow as well. Because of the old track's considerable clout, it may not only prosper as a
tumor, but also crowd out the new track. Another reason for the expansion and survival
of the old track is believed to be the wielding corruption.' 5 '
c. Management Responsibility System
At the end of 1986, China adopted a management responsibility system (MRS),
which enabled the management to contract out state assets and to keep the earnings
above the level it contractually owed the state in order to provide money for expansion,
reinvestment, higher wages and more fringe benefits for the employees.
5 2
This resulted from the growing intention in the 1980s to create an enterprise that
was relatively independent, a socialist commodity producer and an independent business
manager.'53 If such an enterprise conducts its own business, it would be responsible for
its own profits and losses, 154 and be capable of reforming and developing itself according
to law.
To succeed, power had to be delegated to the management of the enterprises to deter-
mine production schedules, purchase supplies, marketing strategies, investment deci-
sions, hiring, firing, rewarding and pricing on the condition that the enterprises respect
the state plans and regulations. 55 It also enhanced the recognition that SOEs, like other
in ECONOMIES, supra note 134, at 217-241, and Ronald A. Cass, Macro-Economic Changes
from Centralized to Market Economies: Big Bang v. Gradual Change: The Optimal Pace of
Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 413 (1995). On the issue of privatisation, see also Mark
Baker, Privatization in the Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills of the Third World
or Prescription Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (1999); Oleh Havrylyshyn
& Donal McGettigan, Privatization in Transition Countries: Lessons of the First Decade (IMF,
August 1999); see also infra note 165.
151. Cao et al., supra note 134, at 34; see also infra note 185 and accompanying text.
152. Sometimes also referred to as "contract responsibility system" (CRS). See Jiang, supra note
128, at 4; Art & Gu, supra note 130, at 279; see also Dodds, supra note 129, at 707-08, 724.
In 1979, the government began allowing some firms to retain a portion of their profits after
meeting their obligations under the state plan; by 1980, it had implemented profit retention
plans nationwide and began introducing work-related pay and bonuses. After meeting their
plan targets, SOEs could make purchases and sales on the market. A dual track system
emerged under which most goods had a plan price and a market price. See also Lixin Colin
Xu, Determinants of the Re-Partitioning of Property Rights between the Government and State
Enterprises, World Bank (1997).
153. Jiang, supra note 128, at 3; Art & Gu, supra note 130, at 278-79.
154. An example is the introduction of the PRC Bankruptcy Law enacted by the 6th NPC on
2 December 1986. See Mark E. Montfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterprise and the
Bankruptcy Law in the People's Republic of China, 22 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.1067 (1997).
155. Decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Reform of
the Economic System (1984 Decision), passed on Oct. 20, 1984. Another milestone, the
State-Owned Industrial Enterprise Law of the PRC (SOIEL) was enacted on 13 April 1988, by
the First Session of the 7th NPC. It formally restricted many of the powers of the Department
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enterprises, should have the status of legal person. 5 6 Gradually, planning decreased while
pricing for commodities was liberalised.
To make enterprises sensitive to the difference between costs and revenues, the gov-
ernment required since 1981 that capital construction projects for SOEs had to obtain
their funds through interest-bearing bank loans instead of from government sponsored
interest-free capital appropriations.'57
The management responsibility system also had its shortcomings, though.' The
management contracts encouraged short-term behaviour and neglected long-term invest-
ments in order to maximise profits during the contract period. Managers were not
always punished for failure. The contract system was also too rigid for China's rapidly
changing economic environment, causing the government to adopt a policy of lowering
.contract targets when external events made it difficult for enterprises to fulfil their con-
tractual obligations. It made the enforcement of contracts discretionary and weakened
their incentive effects. So, in January 1994, the government stopped initiating responsi-
bility contracts, with existing contracts expiring in 1996-97. The new system that would
have to establish independent enterprise management was corporatisation.
d. Corporatisation
In the early 1990s, the southern tour by Deng Xiaoping and his remark that "the
planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, nor is the market economy equivalent
to capitalism" reaffirmed the commitment of the state to economic reform. In October
1992, the 14th Chinese Communist Congress declared that the party would strive to
establish a "socialist market economy."'5 9 Around the same time, new laws tried to radi-
cally reshape the financial composition of the state enterprise as a budgetary unit of the
in Charge (see supra note 130), but it provided these rights only subject to "regulations of the
State Council." This left the limits of SOE autonomy vague and open to official arbitrariness.
See Jiang, supra note 128, at 3-4; see also Blumental, supra note 132, at 229-30; Henry R.
Zheng, Business Organization and Securities Laws of the People's Republic of China, 42 Bus.
LAW. 549, 558 (1988).
156. Article 41, General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC (GPCL), 12 July 1986, effective
1 January 1987. Article 48 sets forth that the enterprise must meet its civil obligations and
Article 82 states that the enterprise enjoys the right to manage the assets as authorised by
the State. See also Zheng, supra note 155, at 553.
157. Clarke (1992), supra note 129, at 296.
158. See Lixin Colin Xu, The Productivity Effects of Decentralized Reforms: An Analysis of the Chinese
Industrial Reforms, World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 1723 (1997), at 30 (noting that
adopting the Management Responsibility System and raising profit retention rates, probably
the most important reforms as viewed by the Chinese government and many scholars, did
not improve productivity much; in fact, there is weak evidence that MRS even might have
reduced productivity growth.
159. Jiang, supra note 128, at 5. These reforms were legally consolidated inter alia the 1992 Reg-
ulations, which redefined the SOIEL (supra note 155) in terms of meeting the needs of the
market. See State Council, Regulations for the Transformation of Management Mechanisms
of the State Industrial Enterprises (1992 Regulations), Promulgated on 23 July 1992. The
decrease in government intervention impacted areas such as product pricing, mandatory
planning, business operations, technical innovations, labour and personnel affairs and the
internal income distribution. See also Blumental, supra note 132, at 231. Only the right to
negotiate foreign trade contracts had not been delegated to the enterprises.
Winter/Spring 2001 65
state's financial plan, with the objective of course to achieve a balance of enterprise funds
rather than to reimburse costs to the state. However, audit results have led to a sobering
depiction of economic reality and led to only some degree of fiscal responsibility and
accounting of assets and capital."6
To clarify the separation of the right to own from the right to manage in the public
economic sector the constitution was changed.'
6
' The 1993 Communist Party Decision 16 2
called for further renovations of the state enterprise system to effectively separate the
government administration from enterprise management and to end the dependency by
state enterprises on bureaucratic government agencies.' 6 3 This policy document finally
resulted in the 1993 Company Law.
164
The Company Law reaffirms China's commitment to socialism; however, China's
reform programme is not the kind of privatisation experienced by the nations of
Eastern Europe. 16 What has happened in China is preferably called corporatisation
160. See, e.g., Ministry of Finance, General Provisions for Enterprise Finance (GPEF) (Nov. 30,
1992); see also Regulations for Enterprise Accounting (REA) (Nov. 30, 1992); Jiang, supra
note 128, at 6. For further reference, see Chi-Wan Yang & Jiliang Yang, HANDBOOK OF
CHINESE ACCOUNTING (1999). See also Yun-wei Tang et al., ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE IN
CHINA (3d ed. 1996). China is apparently planning to bring its accounting systems in line
with international practice. See China to Overhaul Accounting System, CHINAONLINE NEWS,
Nov. 14, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
161. The First Session of the 8th NPC amended Article 16 to change "state-run enterprise" into
"state-owned enterprise' See also Jiang, supra note 128, at 8.
162. Decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on a Few Issues in
Establishing the Socialist Market Economic System, adopted at the Third Plenary Session of
the 14th Chinese Communist Party Congress, on Nov. 14, 1993. See Jiang, supra note 128,
at 8-9. The 1993 Decision goes further than the 1984 Decision (supra note 155), which
only assured the separation of the right to own an enterprise from the right to manage one.
According to the 1993 Decision the state changes its role from the administrative authority
in charge of the enterprise to the investor, or shareholder of the company. The State is only
entitled to normal shareholder rights and cannot interfere directly in the management. The
enterprise acquires the legal rights to dispose of the assets of the enterprise, which it must
manage independently and assume sole responsibility for profits and losses. Shareholders are
only responsible for the liabilities to the extent of their investment. See also Dodds, supra
note 129, at 710-11.
163. For a clear picture of initial bureaucratic involvement and communist party involvement in
these enterprises, see Zheng, supra note 155, at 559.
164. PRC, Company Law, adopted at the 5th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th NPC,
on Dec. 29, 1993, effective 1 July 1994. See Art & Gu, supra note 130, at 280; Anna M. Han,
China's Company Law: Practising Capitalism in a Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y
J. 457 (1996).
165. These economies together with the former Soviet Union experienced shock treatment eco-
nomic programs in which transfer of ownership stood central. To date, some members of
the Chinese leadership are still convinced that expanding the autonomy of SOEs without
changing ownership is the way to solve the current problems in SOEs. For a comparative
view with China, see Dodds, supra note 129, at 746. See also Woo et al., supra note 134.
It is generally argued that China has achieved its economic boom by applying a policy of
gradual reform, rather than large-scale privatisation. Gradual reforms have provided a stable
environment for investment and allow time for the development of laws and institutions
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or stockification, which entails the restructuring of enterprises, adopting the corpo-
rate form, and instituting stock ownership and consequently stock trading without
necessarily relinquishing the state's controlling interest in the means of production."6
The idea is still that the state continues to regulate the economy, but as a sovereign
implementing policies of general application rather than as an owner micro-managing
individual enterprises.'67 China's stock markets, however, have not replaced the role of
the state with a capital market system. 6 ' They are mainly there to facilitate financing
by channelling consumer savings into productive enterprises.
Since the 1993 Decision, the Chinese government has encouraged breakups and
mergers to reshuffle enterprises to conform them to required norms.'69 This was done
in the first place to avoid major bankruptcies. Other SOEs have been put together to
form groups to organise strategic alliances meant to create economies of scale. 7°
essential to both a properly functioning market economy and a privatisation program. On
the importance of institution building, see Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Ten Years of Postsocialist
Transition: Lessons for Policy Reforms, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2095, April
1999. According to Cao et al., five factors generated growth in China: (1) initial economic
structures, (2) integration into the global economy, (3) saving behaviour, (4) two disastrous
leftist campaigns, and (5) overseas investment. See Cao et al., supra note 134, at 28.
166. The opening of securities exchanges in Shanghai in December 1990 and Shenzhen in June
1991 may have created a structure whereby state agencies no longer manage the details
of day-to-day operations, but government administrative agencies have retained controlling
rights through ownership of key state and legal person shares. See Blumental, supra note 132,
at 223. See also Dodds, supra note 129, at 712. He calls the Chinese strategy a strategy
of marketisation, introducing markets and competition without relinquishing control over
SOEs. On the explanation of corporatisation, see also p. 727.
167. See Clarke (1992), supra note 129, at 289.
168. See Dodds, supra note 129, at 709. He writes that already in the mid 1980s local authorities
and entrepreneurs set up small, unofficial securities markets in a number of cities around
the country. On capital markets in China, see also Jay Zhe Zhang, Securities Markets and
Securities Regulation in China, 22 N.C.J. INT'L L. COM. REG. 557 (1997). See also Brian Daly,
Of Shares, Securities, and Stakes: The Chinese Insider Trading Law and The Stakeholder Theory
of Legal Analysis, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & Poi!Y 971 (1996); Andrew X. Qian, Why Does Not
the Rising Water Lift the Boat? Internationalization of the Stock Markets and the Securities
Regulatory Regime in China, 29 INT'L LAW. 615 (1995); William D. Holmes, China's Financial
Reforms in the Global Market, 28 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 715 (1997); Kevin T. S. Kong, Prospects
for Asset Securitization within China's Legal Framework: The Two-Tiered Model, 32 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 237 (1998); C. YAO, CHINA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM UNDER TRANSITION (1998). PRC,
Securities Law, adopted by the Sixth Session of the Ninth National People's Congress Standing
Committee on Dec. 29, 1998.
169. See, e.g., International Mergers and Acquisitions Will Attract Foreign Capital, says MOFTEC,
CHINAONLINE NEWS, Oct. 11, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com (noting that M&A has
been an important focus of research).
170. See Dodds, supra note 128, at 735-37.
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e. Social Costs
Despite these reforms, the state-run system has suffered chronically from losses,
inefficiency, and insufficient productivity. A substantial portion of workers is xia gang.171
The government's use of state enterprises for both production and delivery of welfare
services constitutes a further structural impediment. 172
Many of the difficulties in creating a market economy by downsizing the SOE
track are associated with accounting for the irrational debt liabilities, employees' sup-
port programmes, and extensive social commitments. Because the state's social security
reform'73 lags behind enterprise reform, the insurance funds for retirement, unemploy-
ment,'74 medical care and labour casualties must be generated from diminishing enter-
prise resources and state funds.'75
Eventually, the postponement of fundamental reforms has caused severe damage to
the Chinese financial system as well.'76
4. Compliance with Article XVII GATT
Let us now return to the main concern of Article XVII GATT, viz. that maintaining
China's large state-owned economic presence could enable the country to evade the
effective responsibilities and policies of GATT/WTO even though such an economy can
be in complete conformity with the technical rules of GATT.'77
171. See Art & Gu, supra note 130, at 277. Xia gang or off-post is a euphemism for workers who
are employed on paper but are not expected to report for work and thus are paid only a
fraction of their previous income.
172. Chinese enterprises routinely provide their workers with housing, medical care, pensions
and a host of other social services as part of the "iron rice-bowl" or lifetime employment
and social benefits. See Art & Gu, supra note 130, at 278. This is an important reason why
bankruptcies of inefficient enterprises are so few.
173. See, e.g., Peter Nan-shong Lee, Reforming the Social Security System in China, in PUBLIC
POLICY IN CHINA 53 (S. Nagel & M. Mills eds., 1993); G. Sun, Health Care Administration in
China, id. at. 53-62.
174. See, e.g., Bank of China to Layoff 15,000 Employees, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Oct. 19, 2000,
at http://www.chinaonline.com. Nevertheless, the WTO is generally believed to create new
jobs in the private sector. See Kitt Marlow, WTO Deal to Bring China Jobs, Says Economist,
CHINAONLINE NEWS, Oct. 16, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
175. Jiang, supra note 128, at 12-13. On the social costs of market reform, see Carol Graham,
Strategies for Addressing the Social Costs of Market Reforms: Lessons for Transition Economies in
East Asia and Eastern Europe, in ECONOMIES, supra note 134, at 325-55. China is apparently
serious about beefing up its social security programme. See China Earmarks US 652 Million
for Social Security, CHINAONLINE NEWS. Aug. 11, 2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
176. See Lardy, supra note 134, at 4-5. Unwilling to tolerate urban employment that would accom-
pany the widespread bankruptcy of loss-making firms, the state assumed the burden of
subsidising growing losses through fiscal subsidies and, increasingly, through so-called policy
loans from the state-owned banks. This resulted in huge financial liabilities on the part of
Chinese firms. The reason for borrowing such large sums is that they are obligated to provide
a broad range of social services that should be financed from the government budget. On
financial reform, see also HAIQUN YANG, BANKING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL IN REFORMING
PLANNED ECONOMIES (1996).
177. Jackson, supra note 105, at 892.
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On the surface China has formally revised its state-trading system by increasing the
number of traditional FTCs through a profound decentralisation and by awarding FTR to
a more diversified number of FTOs such as SOEs, and in doing so dismantling many of
the trade monopolies. Yet on a deeper, structural level we are forced to believe that SOEs,
which take up a large number of Chinese FTOs, do not live up to the expectations of
the concerns indirectly addressed by Article XVII GATT. Below we explain that Chinese
SOB reform does not cut deep enough. Firstly the decentralisation of trade monopolies
raises serious concerns of transparency and secondly corporate governance in China
is not adequate to preclude the (local) government from interfering in the day-to-day
management of companies. Therefore, it is hard to say that state enterprises only operate
in accordance with free market considerations to conform to Article XVII GATT. Finally,
this section addresses the adverse use of subsidies in the Chinese state economy.
a. Defunct Decentralisation
A central feature of the reforms was the decentralisation of FTR beyond the handful
of centrally controlled FTC. 7 ' Despite the large number of trading firms overall, there
are still two broad groups of commodities for which the number of firms entitled to
engage in trade is tightly restricted.'79 These products are typically handled by one or
a few designated FTOs, making direct control of the quantities imported and exported
very practical. This regime is an important special feature of the Chinese trade system,
but very much a minority part of the overall system. The heavy reliance on it for major
agricultural trade raises, however, concerns. 180
But the manner of State trading goes beyond the classical use of FTCs and it involves
other FTOs such as the SOE. Depending upon the manner in which these enterprises
undertake business, State trading still could form a serious distortion.
Note that "State-owned" is deceptively difficult to define in a politically or economi-
cally meaningful sense. The enterprise is controlled by one or more units of government
at or above the county level, the so-called Department in Charge.' The power of man-
agement and control rests with one or several bodies with divergent interests and goals.
There is no monolithic Chinese state but only a fragmented one. This phenomenon is
often labelled as "too many mothers-in-law" (popo tai duo).'82
The decentralisation, in which also SOB reform has resulted, makes it difficult for the
central reformers to implement liberal economic policies." 3 Only a few thousand of the
178. In mid 1999, MOFTEC reported that there were around 9,000 FTC. The number of SOEs
and private firms with trading rights for their own products had risen to 12,000 and around
300,000 FIEs had trading rights for their own products. See lanchovichina et al., supra note 96.
179. These involve on the one hand grain, vegetable oils, sugar, tobacco, crude oil, refined oil,
chemical fertiliser, cotton and on the other hand rubber, timber, plywood, wool, acrylics, and
steel products.
180. See generally W. Davey, Article XVII GATT: An Overview, in OPERATIONS OF STATE TRADING
ENTERPRISES As THEY RELATE TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1998).
181. See supra note 130.
182. See Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 7; see also Dodds, supra note 129, at 715.
183. See Jun Ma, Macroeconomic Management and Intergovernmental Relations in China, World
Bank Working Paper, January 1995 (noting that decentralization in China has been crucial
in stimulating regional economic growth and reform, but local governments have attained
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largest SOEs remain under direct central control." 4 At the local level, local bureaucrats
tightly try to hold on to their privileges."' s
Those ministries that traditionally wielded control over the allocation of resources
and the management of large SOEs and industrial groups resist greatly.18 6 The 9th
National People's Congress (NPC), which concluded in mid-March 1998, implemented a
plan to restructure this bureaucracy by cutting the number of ministries from forty-one
to twenty-nine.8 7 Despite the ambitions of reformers, there are problems that yet remain
insurmountable.
While the government decentralised the economy and its bureaucracy it has had
great difficulty in establishing mechanisms to ensure that enterprises respond to the
prescribed policies as intended.' 8 Hence, it is very difficult to police or control any
grants of exclusive or special privileges, whether formal or in effect. Therefore, many
local monopolies might exist and transparent notification becomes a very difficult task.
This transparency is absolutely necessary for members to judge the extent to which state-
trading enterprises serve as a substitute for other measures covered in GATT such as
quantitative restrictions, tariffs and subsidies.
Furthermore, the administrative maze affects commercial decision making, because
the bureaucracy holds the lifeline to whether SOEs have access to the international mar-
ket. Second, the decentralisation has not substituted direct micro-control with indirect
macro-control and hence does not guarantee a uniform application of foreign trade
administration.
de facto control over many policy instruments, seriously weakening the central government's
ability to achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability. In areas where the division of reg-
ulatory power is vaguely defined, local governments' protectionist behaviour has led to a
malfunction in resource allocation).
184. Dodds, supra note 129, at 700.
185. Local governments have significant power and local cadres are not interested to give up their
patronage over SOEs or the revenue they gain through taxes and bribes. Corrupt officials
often demand enterprises to pay various exactions (tanpai). See Blumental, supra note 132, at
234; see also Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 37-42 (notes that local authorities tend to view
successful enterprises as milk cows. From local governments down to the street committee,
from the Department in Charge to the TV station, all come seeking money, usually with the
threat to withhold vital goods or services such as housing, education for employees' children
or police protection). See also Helena Lolenda, One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the
People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control it, 47 J. CHINESE L. 187 (1990).
186. See Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 14 (noting that sub-central levels of the system are able
to thwart and subvert the demands of the centre). The central government, despite efforts of
recentralisation, has never regained the control it lost during the Cultural Revolution. The
vast quantity of legislation produced by the central government cannot change the pre-reform
legal institutions, which remain in many ways unchanged in the position they occupy in the
Chinese polity.
187. See Blumental, supra note 132, at 235.
188. The vision that "the state regulates the market, and the market guides the enterprises" rep-
resents essentially repudiation by the state of its right as an owner to control enterprise
behaviour directly, in favour of more detached and indirect control through legislation. See
Clarke (1992), supra note 129, at 289. Thus, while granting more autonomy to enterprise
managers, the State must develop a monitoring system to ensure that managers do not waste
enterprise assets.
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Finally, it is noted here that the WTO has dealt with countries that at times main-
tained a complete monopoly of their foreign trade like Poland, Hungary, Romania, and
Yugoslavia.'89 But of course China (and Russia) is a much larger economy to deal with
and the economic stakes are much higher this time.
b. Defunct Corporate Governance
Getting the government out of business has proven to be a persistent problem
from the outset of SOE reform. 9 ' The Company Law may be a legal milestone to
corporatise SOEs by converting them into shareholding companies, but the changes it
specifies are largely cosmetic. It falls short of providing enterprises and managers with the
corporate tools they need to build modern companies and maximise efficiency, because
administrative agencies holding controlling shares can still interfere directly in the day-
to-day management and affairs of the company' 9'-a feature earlier reforms already tried
to bring to extinction without success.
Under the Company Law, the state and the company (with its investors) receive
certain legal rights that are ambiguous and at odds. While enterprises obtain the right
of autonomous operations, the state retains legal ownership of state-owned assets, and
the tripartite internal governance system plays into the conflicting interests and rights
of the state, the company, private shareholders and labour representatives. Of concern is
the notion that enterprises must operate under government and CCP supervision.'92
Corporatisation can only be called a success if it achieves two levels of separation,
viz. first when the state's regulatory and administrative powers would be separated from
its enterprise ownership rights; and second, when ownership and management rights
would be separated. 9 3 However, these fundamental principles have been transferred on
paper only. 94 The failure is attributed to the fact that the Berle and Means corporation
cannot just be transplanted to China. 9 ' The State with its highly concentrated ownership
189. The principal documents can be found in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
(BISD). Yugoslavia 8 BISD 17, 18, 64ff; 9 BISD 56ff; 10 BISD 61ff; 11 BISD 52, 79, 50ff; 14
BISD 15, 16, 49ff; 15 BISD 53ff, 63. Poland 8 BISD 12, 61; 11 BISD 72ff; 12 BISD 62ff; 13
BISD 33ff; 14 BISD 46ff; 17 BISD 96ff; 18 BISD 188ff, 201ff; 19 BISD 109ff; 20 BISD 209;
21 BISD 112; 22 BISD 63ff; 24 BISD 139ff. Romania 18 BISD 5ff, 23, 94ff; 20 BISD 217ff;
24 BISD 149ff; 27 BISD 166ff; 30 BISD 194ff. Hungary 20 BISD 3, 17, 34ff; 22 BISD 54ff;
24 BISD 4; 25 BISD 155ff; 27 BISD 156ff; 29 BISD 129ff; 31 BISD 156ff. For parallels with
China, see Yu-shu Feng, China's Membership of GATT A Practical Proposal, 22 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 60 (1988). See also Chung-Chou Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21
J. WORLD TRADE L. 34 (1987).
190. See Blumental, supra note 132, at 228.
191. PRC, Company Law, supra note 164, arts. 66, 67. It must be noted, however, that it concerns
only wholly state-owned enterprises.
192. See (excellent study of the tension between the enterprise's right of autonomous operations
and the government's right of supervision) Joaquin F. Matias, From Work-Units to Corpora-
tions: The Role of Chinese Corporate Governance in a Transitional Market Economy, 12 N.Y.
INT'L L. Rev. 1 (1999).
193. Dodds, supra note 129, at 730.
194. Corporate governance is still under construction in China. See Matias, supra note 192.
195. See Dodds, supra note 129, at 732.
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is unlikely to play the role of a passive investor and with the fears of social unrest will
continue to intervene in SOE operations. A proper separation and balance of ownership
and control is by no means determined by law directly. It is, rather, achieved through
the owner's voluntary avoidance of interfering in the exercise of ownership functions.196
Therefore, proprietary directions inhibiting foreign trade by the government are
still easy to make. The country hides itself behind the protective structure of what it
calls commercial decision-making according to its own market structure. It is true that
some European countries maintained control over a large part of economic resources
by government operation, but their corporate governance 97 and mature administrative
laws tried to form a counterbalance to cabin possible risks.
Questions remain whether the latest Notice of the State Council "Basic Standard
for Large and Medium-Size State-Owned Enterprises to Establish the Modern Enterprise
System and Strengthen Management:' will be able to separate the government functions
from enterprise operation, reform through shareholding and establish standard structures
of governance by legal authorities. 98
c. Subsidies
The provision of subsidies to SOEs, which are mainly involved in exporting, may
run afoul of WTO subsidy disciplines. Although this concern is not directly raised in
Article XVII, of which the disciplines are found in other Articles of GATT, such as
Article VI. The connection between subsidies and SOE reform is nevertheless established
here. The adverse use of subsidies, inherent to state economy, is yet another example
that many Chinese enterprises may not be able to make decisions based on economic
considerations alone.
To harden the budget constraint and make enterprises sensitive to the difference
between costs and revenues, the government requires since 1981 that capital construction
projects for SOEs must obtain their funds through interest-bearing bank loans instead
of from government sponsored interest-free capital appropriations.'
99
Despite efforts to harden the budget constraint by making investment costly, any
cost increase could easily be offset by negotiating concessions on taxes or profit turnovers
196. As Dodds writes, many questions in the Company Law remain unanswered, like what percent-
age of ownership the state reserves, who will represent the State, or how will the ownership
claims of multiple supervisory government units be handled. The law does not explain how
a conflict between State and private shareholders must be handled, and does not protect
minority shareholders. Few is known about fiduciary duties. See Dodds, supra note 129, at
731-33.
197. In this regard monitoring devices such as the takeover market, the managerial market, etc.
are not yet sophisticated enough in China. See, e.g., G. Yu, The Relevance of Comparative
Corporate Governance Studies for China, 8 AusT. I. CORP. L. 49 (1997).
198. See New Regulations Lay Out Reform Plan for SOEs, CHINAONLINE NEWS, Oct. 30, 2000, at
http://www.chinaonline.com.
199. Clarke (1992), supra note 129, at 296.
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or by passing the increases on to buyers.2' Finally, the government remains ready to
pump money into failing enterprises if other remedies fail. 20 1
Making a profit is not a question of life or death in China. If an enterprise can be
funded free from outside sources, there is no incentive to accumulate capital internally
for further growth. It takes note of prices if it feels like it by passing along cost increases
or lobbying with the authorities to obtain a larger tax break or subsidy.20 2 The system
thus encourages SOEs to invest in influencing local bureaucracy rather than in improving
efficiency.
5. Note on Article VIII GATS
20 3
The problems that can arise in the domain of services are to a certain extent dif-
ferent from those in the domain of goods. In services, there is much greater concern
about the monopoly (or non-competing oligopoly) control over essential facilities in the
relevant market. Article VIII GATS, therefore, takes a market-based view as opposed to
the ownership-based view of Article XVII GATT.
20 4
200. The tax system remains remarkably soft and subject to bargaining, enterprises often negotiate
over tax payments in the same way they bargain over output and profit targets. Id.
201. If a Chinese enterprise does not have enough money to cover its obligations, either the State
pays or the creditors are left without recourse because in practice it is very difficult to attach
the property of SOEs. The Bankruptcy Law (see supra note 154) tries to address problems
related to enterprise insolvency where insolvency is perceived to mean that managers are
running an enterprise inefficiently. The law attempts to protect enterprises whose losses result
from, among other things, an irrational structure of prices, production quotas, or labour
allocation. Unfortunately it is almost impossible to distinguish between these types of losses.
The law's goal of preserving socially valuable, but economically inefficient enterprises puts
the whole procedure back in the realm of bargaining and negotiation. Thus the law fails
to make enterprises sensitive to market signals. See the discussion in Clarke (1992), supra
note 129, at 298-300. See also Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 51; supra note 176.
202. See also Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 9-11 (lists five conditions by Kornai each sufficient
to render the budget constraint soft: (1) the firm is a price maker, not a price taker; (2) the
tax system is soft; (3) the enterprise receives free state grants; (4) the credit system is soft
(see supra note 201); and (5) external financial investment is made on soft conditions). For
a similar discussion, see Dodds, supra note 129, at 717.
203. For further reference on GATS, see B. HOEKMAN & M. KoSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM-FROM GATT TO WTO 127 (1995) B. Hoekman, Market
Access through Multilateral Agreement: From Goods to Services, 15 WORLD ECONOMY 707-28
(1992); B. Hoekman, Tentative First Steps: An Assessment of the Uruguay Round, World Bank,
May 1995; John H. Jackson, Constructing a Constitution for Trade in Services, 11 WORLD
ECONOMY 187-202 (1988); F. Weiss, The General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994, 32
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1177-1225 (1995); P. Nicolaides, Economic Aspects of Services:
Implications for a GATT Agreement, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 125-36 (1989); P. Sauve, Assessing the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Half-Full or Half-Empty? 29 J. WORLD TRADE 125-45
(1995); R. Frid, Multilateral Liberalization of Trade in Services under the GATS, 11 SEW 410-
16 (November 1998). On Article VIII GATS in particular see Aaditya Mattoo, Dealing with
Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO Rules for Goods and Services, WTO, January 1997.
204. Some form of government involvement is a necessary condition insofar as it is required
that the monopoly or non-competing oligopoly be "authorised or established formally or in
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The disciplines of Article XVII resemble the disciplines of Article VIII. The supplier
of the monopoly service should not act in a manner inconsistent with a member's MFN
obligation and specific commitments. The scope, however, depends on the extent to
which members have made liberalising specific commitments20 5 under GATS on both
market access and national treatment.
20 6
Likewise Article VIII GATS, as Article XVIII GATT, does not create an obligation
to change either the pattern of ownership or the market structure, but recognises the
possible distortion of trade and the importance of negotiations. Changes in ownership
and market structure, however, have been central to accession negotiations. China has
committed to eliminate most foreign equity restrictions in all major service categories.20 7
Most commonly localised services like transport, telecommunications 20 8 and energy
distribution are among the monopolies whose supply behaviour merits concern. In this
regard, the electric power industry in China is being organised into conglomerates com-
posed of both corporate and government entities clustered around certain industrial
sectors. Therefore, the same transparency and ownership-management concerns exist




The Uruguay Round has not provided us with a separate treaty on State trading. To
induce countries to accept such a treaty without appropriate quid pro quo is infeasible.
Furthermore, Articles XVII GATT and VIII GATS are not rigorous enough in addressing
the structural problems regarding Chinese State trading. Therefore, the possible disrup-
tion caused by Chinese SOEs must be effectively addressed in the accession negotiations.
Members' fact finding in this regard has caused considerable delay in the swift accession
of China.
China has agreed that it will not influence commercial decisions except in a WTO
consistent manner and will allow SOEs to make purchases and sales solely based on
commercial considerations. Both Article XVII GATT and XIII GATS have the unusual
effect" by a member (art. XXVIII (h) GATS). Therefore one can say that natural monopolies
and oligopolies which exist without any facilitating government action are outside the scope
of article VIII GATS. See Mattoo, supra note 203.
205. China has made commitments in all major service categories with reasonable transitions.
They involve inter alia services auxiliary to distribution, telecommunications, insurance,
banking, securities, professional services, the audio-visual sector, and travel and tourism.
206. As we noted earlier national treatment does not seem to apply in GATT at all. See supra
note 99.
207. U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, Nov. 15, 1999.
208. Telecommunications take a special place regarding the application of article VIII GATS
through the GATS Annex on Telecommunications and The Reference Paper: Ensuring Com-
petition in the Supply of Telecom Services. Particularly useful in this regard is Mattoo, supra
note 203.
209. See Daniel C. K. Chow, An Analysis of the Political Economy of China's Enterprise Conglomer-
ates: A Study of the Reform of the Electric Power Industry in China, 28 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
383 (1997).
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aspect in the WTO context that they apply to the behaviour of enterprises, not to gov-
ernment rules of general application." ° In this regard, we have demonstrated that the
SOE reform does not cut deep enough and that it takes more than above government's
commitment to convince mature WTO members. Therefore, the European Community
and the United States have developed a longer-term strategy to deal with non-market
economies, which will not be discussed here. Basically, it involves special antidump-
ing and anti-subsidy measures, and a relaxed safeguard clause modelled on Article XIX
GATT.
SOE reform in China makes us wiser about the difficulties to 'interface' the different
economic systems into one universal WTO. The WTO, however, should continue to
protect market economies from non-market economies as far as they try to enable the
responsibilities and policies of WTO. Chinese SOEs definitely have the potential to evade
these responsibilities and policies by, for example, proprietary directions due to a defunct
decentralisation and the lack of effective corporate governance. By consequence, China
undermines the access to its market for other members.
C. ESTABLISHING A RULE OF LAW AND WTO COMPLIANCE
It has become clear from previous sections that law is the main instrument to
accomplish China's economic reforms. China takes an instrumental approach towards
the rule of law. Chinese imperial legal history and Marxism influence this approach.2 '
For socio-historical and political reasons, however, the Western rule of law concept has
become the standard, by which the institutions of Chinese society, from which Westerners
are culturally removed, are evaluated to satisfy WTO compliance.
Further, state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and Articles XVII GATT, VIII GATS
have already hinted at the possible lack of transparency. This concern is addressed mainly
in Article X GATT and the transparency issue has been a subject in both the U.S.-China
Memorandum on Market Access 212 and the Draft Protocol on China.213 The core of
transparency as it is addressed in Article X GATT and the documents mentioned goes
to the very heart of China's legal infrastructure, and more precisely to the nature and
enforcement of its administrative law regime. 214
At the time Article X was drafted, transparency did not have the 'veil dropping'
meaning it has in the present WTO, but replicated very much the American approach
to emerging administrative law in the 1920s and 1930s. 211 Since the establishment of the
WTO, however, transparency of the legal system has become a vastly expanded concept
210. See Mattoo, supra note 203.
211. See, e.g., J. Wang, The Role of Law in Contemporary China: Theory and Practice, Ph.D. Thesis,
Department of Government, Cornell University. On Marxism and Law, see H. COLLINS,
MARXISM AND LAW (Oxford, Clarendon, 1982).
212. See art. 1, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Market Access, 10 October 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1274. For completeness' sake there is also a Memorandum of Understanding on the
Protection of Intellectual Property, 17 January 1992, which is not our focus here.
213. See art. 2 (C) and (D) Draft Protocol on China, 6 March 1996, on file with author.
214. See Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR.
AFF. 1, 2 (1998).
215. Id. at 4-5.
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and now requires, for example, the publication of laws, regulations, and the mode of
administration in tradable services or, to a more limited extent, investment regimes.216
To satisfy the transparency requirement, China's accession to the WTO obliges the
Chinese government to make China a more rule-based society than it has ever been.
Tremendous efforts in the last decade have improved China's situation greatly,217 yet a
number of concerns still exist.
These concerns comprise the unpredictability of the legal system through policy
laws, the lack of transparency due to the bureaucratic heavy hand, and the problems
surrounding judicial review and lack of enforcement. These shortcomings undermine
Chinese market access obligations because foreign traders and investors must struggle
their way through a forest of administrative regulations and find it hard to seek legal
redress.
1. Policy versus Law
To understand the position of the law in China, it is necessary to understand the
position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 218 Despite the erosion of the ruling
ideology, which caused the discipline and the cohesion of the CCP to decline,219 legis-
lation remains dependent on the CCP's formulation of specific policies.22' Sometimes
important policies are announced in laws that are accompanied by statements by the
216. Id. at 9-10.
217. The 1992 MOU substantially improved the transparency of China's foreign trade regime and
the full implementation of it should bring China in conformity with GATT Article X. See
Patrick H. Hu, The China 301 on Market Access: A Prelude to GATT Membership? 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 132, 144-45 (1994). One of the major improvements was the adoption of the
PRC, Foreign Trade Law (FTL), enacted by the 8th NPC on 12 May 1994. This law prescribes
that foreign trade policy and regulations must be published freely and bans or restrictions on
imports and exports must conform to GATT rules and be transparent. The FTL addresses the
issues of unified national trade policy, transparency and conformity with GATT principles
and international practices with respect to NTBs, market access, anti-dumping, subsidies
and safeguard issues. On these improvements, see Man, supra note 110, at 493; Wang, supra
note 111.
218. On the role of the CCP in law and society, see generally A. Chen, An Introduction to Chinese
Law, Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP.
219. See S. ZHENG, PARTY VS. STATE IN POST-1949 CHINA (1997), at 4 (noting that China is facing a
deep institutional crisis because of the disarray in the CCP and that the country is faced with
the challenge of providing an alternative). On the erosion of Party control over lawmaking, see
M. TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAwMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES,
AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS (1999), at 51ff.
220. See Stanley Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xioaping: 'Mao and Mediation'
Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229, 257 (1997). Or more extensively, see the same author's
book, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999). See Clarke (1991), supra
note 129, at 17-18. Although the National People's Congress (NPC) is a weak parliamentary
body, it is no longer a rubber stamp and is constitutionally the supreme sovereign body of
the PRC. The NPC elects a Standing Committee, which exercises the authority of the NPC
when the NPC is not in session. However, major pieces of legislation must still receive prior
Party approval and much of their content is decided before the NPC becomes involved. On
the rise of the NPC system, see Tanner, supra note 219, at 72.
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CCP and CCP directives are still used to modify policies, previously given legislative
expression.22' Therefore, the distinction between law and policy is blurred and the result
is a gap between the law on its face and the norms that are actually applied.
The perception that the Chinese have been ruled for decades by arbitrary and fre-
quently hypocritical cadres has led some Chinese to think that government by objective
rules is desirable and that under such government certain rights ought to be recognised
and protected by the uniform application of rules.222 But President Jiang's four-character
slogan "rule the country according to law" emphasises only the need to protect long-term
peace and stability."3 Political stability is shorthand for regime survival and important
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve export policy goals. Hence, the law is
and must stay secondary to policy.2 24
The Party regime can thus revise legal policy anytime according to practical experi-
ence and can still intervene and resume total control whenever it deems the foundation
of the regime as under threat. 225 There is even a darker side to this "flexibility." Officials
in the right position can easily legalise their illegal profits by quoting and practising
flexibility in the productive process and silence their critics by also applying flexibility
in politics. 226
However, the supremacy of party policy over the law cannot guarantee a stable
legislative environment to deal with foreign trade issues involving investment, banking,
finance, tax, etc., as long as foreign investors and China traders remain exposed to the
legendary arbitrariness of Chinese policy makers. Moreover, laws are drafted in such
vague terms that their interpretation can change overnight to suit any sudden policy
change.2 27
The importance attached to underlying policies thus creates a legal system that is
fluid and very changeable and hence unreliable. It allows the current regime to maintain
the appearance of a viable legal system while retaining within its actual operation many
facets of policy implementation, namely, changeability and adaptation to local normative
structures and conditions. 22t These characteristics are reinforced by the administrative
nature of the legal system as explained below.
221. Lubman, supra note 220, at 244.
222. Id. at 246. See also the discussion in Chapter I about the rule of law in China.
223. Id. at 245; see also Chih-Yu Shih, China's Socialist Law Under Reform: The Class Nature
Reconsidered, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 642 (1996). Socialist legality must meet two demands. First
it must meet stability, in order to promote the productive force; and secondly, flexibility, in
order to cope with the complexities involved. On political stability, see also note 147.
224. See Lubman, supra note 220, at 245; see also M. Tanner, The Erosion of Communist Party
Control over Lawmaking in China, CHINA Q. 381 (1994); M. Tanner, How a Bill Becomes Law
in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking, CHINA Q. 39 (1995).
225. Id.
226. See Shih, supra note 223, at 643.
227. See Peter Howard Come, Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Investment Regula-
tion in China, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 247 (1995). On legislative drafting, see LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING FOR MARKET REFORM: SOME LESSONS FROM CHINA (A. Seidman & R. Seidman
eds., 1997).
228. See Come, supra note 227, at 263.
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2. Administrative System
The executive centered state apparatus headed by the State Council2 9 supervises
many departments including ministries, commissions, administrations and offices. 2
30
These central administrative agencies all possess authority to issue regulations to imple-
ment specific legislation under a grant of such power by a legislative body, and also a
technically distinct type of authority to execute their general administrative responsibil-
ities to issue any rule that is necessary to carry out their functions.2 1 Until recently no
procedural rules existed to govern the enactment of these important rules. 232 Although
a formal hierarchy of norms exists,23 3 the confusing range of documents and the blurred
distinction between primary and secondary, implementing, legislation create a disorderly
hierarchy of rules.
23 1
In this disorder administrative agencies wield law-making powers to protect or
increase their jurisdiction and to advance their policies, helped by the fact that these
bureaucracies alone possess the power to interpret the rules they issue.2 35 This gives rise
229. The State Council is considered to be an administrative organ, not a legislative, and hence
can pass only administrative rules (xingzhengfagui). See Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 18.
230. See Lubman, supra note 220, at 254, 257. Most legislation originates in the State Council and
those ministries, commissions and bureaux that are subordinate to it. The boundary between
administrative legislation that is the proper subject of the executive branch, the State Council,
and the pure legislative activity that is reserved to the NPC is often obscured. In its legally
mandated role, the State Council enjoys too much power.
231. On the State Council lawmaking system, see Tanner, supra note 219, at 120.
232. This has recently changed somewhat under the PRC, Lawmaking Law, Mar. 15, 2000, enacted
by the 3rd plenary meeting of the 9th NPC. See alo Yahong Li, The Law-Making Law: A
Solution to the Problems in the Chinese Legislative System? 30 H.K.L.J. 120 (2000).
233. Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 26, notes that rules promulgated by hierarchical bodies have
corresponding degrees of authority, but the Chinese legal system still has to come up with a
definitive hierarchy that would enable rules to be ranked according to such features as label
and promulgating body. See also note 234.
234. Lubman, supra note 220, at 258; see also Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 26-27 (noting
that regulations issued by the State Council or one of its ministries may be given greater
weight than laws issued by the NPC because the latter are often vague statements of general
principle that explicitly contemplate subsequent implementing rules). Li, supra note 232, at
122. Come, supra note 227, at 252 (according to whom the hierarchy goes as follows: The
NPC and its standing committee issues various enactments that can loosely be categorised as
'law'; the State Council issues administrative regulations (xinzheng fagui), the organs under
the State Council, on the other hand, issue what are known as administrative rules (xingzheng
guizhang); local people's congresses issue local administrative regulations (difang xingzheng
fagui) and local people's government of provinces, municipalities, and quite big cities may
issue local administrative rules (difang xinzheng guizhang); other normative documents (qita
de guifangxing wenjian) formulated by national or local administrative organs for the purpose
of regulation are not enforceable as law).
235. The legislature is viewed as the sole source of law in China where the courts may only
"apply" laws. This means that the Court's interpretive function is limited to clarifying and
strengthening the laws without changing their original meaning. Only the Supreme People's
Court issues official interpretations and opinions either on entire laws or on specific sections
and may in practice establish new rules or even contradict NPC legislation. See Lubman,
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to all kinds of policy statements, administrative regulations, meetings, notices, instruc-
tions and speeches that are given legal effectiveness because they emanate from authori-
tative government and Party bodies.236 These practices worsen the disorder because these
"policy laws" do not set precise limits on legal and illegal behaviour nor define the legal
consequences of failure to comply and are procedurally unclear.2 37
Although progress has been made in publishing collections of laws, many ministerial
regulations and much provincial and local legislation remains internal or difficult to
obtain, even when it is technically public.23 Even if transparent sets of rules exist, the
entrenched bureaucracy has been recalcitrant in adhering to them. 39 Apart from finding
the applicable norm, however, it is crucial to find legal redress and enforce the rights
that come under the law.
3. Legal Redress and Law Enforcement
Article X GATT, which, as mentioned above, goes to the heart of a country's legal
infrastructure, 240 as well as the above-mentioned Sino-U.S. Bilateral ATO Agreement and
China's Draft Protocol, mention the importance of legal redress and law enforcement.
This is particularly relevant in the Chinese context where 'bureaucratic overreaching'
often causes administrative interference with foreign investors' business.
214
a. Legal Redress
The principles set forth in Article 41 of the PRC Constitution 242 as reaffirmed in
Article 121 of the PRC General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), 243 as well as the 1989
Administrative Litigation Law (ALL),244 are among the legal milestones dealing with this
supra note 220, at 349-52; Li, supra note 232, at 137; see also Nanping Liu, Judicial Interpre-
tation in China: Opinions of the SPC, Hong Kong, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997.
236. See Lubman, supra note 220, at 261-62.
237. Lubman, supra note 220, at 372 (notes that foreign investors commonly experience this
problem as one of the more troubling features of the Chinese investment environment and
that it is a fact of life for the Chinese to deal with it); see also Jerome A. Cohen & John E.
Lange, The Chinese Legal System: A Primer for Investors, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
345 (1997).
238. Lubman, supra note 220, at 260. In October 1988, it was announced that "all administrative
laws and regulations issued by the State Council" would be signed by the Premier, published
in the Bulletin of the State Council and in the People's Daily, and distributed by the New
China News Agency.
239. Blumental, supra note 132, at 235.
240. See Ostry, supra note 214, at 2.
241. See David L. Weller, The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for Foreign Investors
to Challenge Agency Action, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1238 (1998).
242. See PRC, Constitution, 1982, Art. 41.
243. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC (GPCL), 12 July 1986, effective 1 January
1987, Art. 121.
244. See PRC, Administrative Litigation Law, 1989, effective 1 October 1990. On Administrative
Law in China, see generally L. Feng, Administrative Law-Procedures and Remedies in China,
Hong Kong, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996. See also Xixin Wang, Administrative Procedure Reforms
in China's Rule of Law Context, 12 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 251 (1998).
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requirement. Moreover, many Chinese laws and regulations specifically provide for the
right to appeal against administrative agencies to appeal to People's Courts.245
The GPCL asserts the basic tenet that the State can incur liability to citizens or
entities as is recognised in the PRC Constitution.246 But it is the passage of the ALL
that rendered these rights more concrete. It both strengthens general checks against
governmental control in China and offers foreign investors a legal means to challenge
intrusive agency action.2 47
The ALL imposes two explicit limits. First, it does not permit a plaintiff to chal-
lenge the inherent validity of abstract regulations and rules under which a particular
administrative act is implemented. Instead, it only allows a review of the lawfulness of
concrete acts. 248 For example, a court can only refuse to apply a conflicting lower-level
regulation if it conflicts with the Constitution, national law, or a State Council regula-
tion. The court may not strike down such an abstract rule, but will refer the matter for
resolution to the State Council. Alternatively, an injured party may seek administrative
reconsideration, through which the applicable agency may modify or declare void a con-
crete administrative act. However, the agency reconsidering the administrative act and
relevant regulation may be in the same hierarchy as the original deciding agency and
may have drafted the regulation itself.249
The second limitation on causes of action in Article 12 ALL permits certain con-
crete acts to be immunised from judicial challenge. 2 ° This limitation is understandable,
because it immunises laws and regulations promulgated by the legislative branch of the
government only as distinct from the administrative branch.
Notwithstanding these limits, an injured party's frustration is more likely to arise
from other deficiencies in the Chinese legal system, such as insufficiently developed
procedural law and the general inefficacy of the courts.25'
Although the law permits a challenge of administrative actions, its effectiveness is
limited by constraints on the power of the courts. Chinese courts are viewed as bureau-
cratic institutions.25 2 Traditional practice treats judges as cadres whose functions are not
distinct from those of other officials. 253 For the first thirty years of the PRC, Chinese
245. This is, for example, the case in the PRC, Customs Law.
246. See Weller, supra note 241, at 1255-56.
247. Id. at 1257.
248. Article 12, ALL. "Concrete acts" have been construed by the Supreme People's Court as
"unilateral acts or conduct, relating to specific matters and the rights and interests of specific
citizens or legal persons.' The general regulation itself, however, may not be struck down.
See Weller, supra note 241, at 1259-60.
249. See id. at 1260-61.
250. Id. at 1261.
251. Id. at 1262.
252. Courts are no powerful arbiters like they are expected to be in Western jurisdictions. They
are just part of the bureaucratic system and are therefore no more important than the post
office or a public utility.
253. See Lubman, supra note 220, at 311, 362. Most of China's judges came to their positions
through transfer from Party and military posts throughout the 1980. Most lacked university
education, and very few have received formal legal instruction. There are special training
efforts but overall educational levels remain low. See also Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at
21-22.
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courts only existed essentially in form but not in substance and were eradicated dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. Since 1979, the system has been extensively rebuilt." 4 The
usefulness of the law is thus restrained by the systemic weaknesses of the Chinese legal
system, as we shall further explore below.
b. Law Enforcement
Apart from the intrusions of policy into the daily work of the courts, 255 the most
serious problem is enforcement. 2 6 It is estimated that twenty percent to thirty percent
of the economic dispute cases on which courts make decisions are not enforced.2 7
A variety of reasons exist that explain why judgements may be unenforceable. Fac-
tors within the judicial system itself make enforcement of decisions unlikely. Chinese
courts are, in general, reluctant to use coercive means towards enforcement. Instead,
Chinese culture favours mediation. 2" Another societal and judicial factor is that courts
254. On the Chinese judicial system, see, e.g., Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 19; See also Lub-
man, supra note 220, at 306. There exist courts of general jurisdiction as well as specialised
courts like railway, forestry, maritime and military courts. The latter type's jurisdiction is
not limited by administrative territorial boundaries like the former type. General jurisdiction
courts are organised hierarchically. At the top stands the Supreme People's Court, followed
by Higher Level People's Courts (Provincially and in Municipals directly under the Cen-
tral Government, as well as in Autonomous Regions like Tibet), Intermediate Level People's
Courts (Prefectural Levels, as well as provincially larger cities directly beneath the Provincial
Government) and Basic Level People's Courts (rural and urban counties or districts). The
pyramid is not very neat, because higher courts sometimes exercise primary jurisdiction over
cases that would have an "influence" on their territory. Courts of general jurisdiction have
separate divisions for criminal, administrative, civil and economic matters and enforcement.
255. Not only is it possible that local power holders will interfere with the decision making process
of a court, but also decision making by the Chinese Communist Party is still allowed in
specific cases. This is done by the so-called Party's Political-Legal Committees.
256. See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Enforcement of
Civil Judgements, 10 COL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996); see also Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of
Civil Judgements in China, CHINA Q. 65 (1995).
257. "At present, the most prominent problem in economic adjudication is the difficulty of execut-
ing judgements" Zheng Tianxiang, President of the Supreme People's Court, 1988 in Supreme
People's Work Report, April 1, 1988. In this report for the NPC he said that 20 percent of
judgements in economic cases went unenforced in 1985 and 1986, while about 30 percent in
1987. Good statistics are however not available. It is also unclear how many of these cases
involve foreigners or FIEs.
258. See Stanley Lubman, International Commercial Dispute Resolution in China: A Practical Assess-
ment, 4 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 107 (1993). Among the masses education and persuasion is to
be used whereas coercion in Maoist view is reserved for the enemy. See excerpts from "Anal-
ysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" and "On
the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in Z. MAO, SELECTED WORKS,
Vol. 1, 4 and 5, Beijing, Langs Press, 1965, 1969, and 1977.
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are concerned only with criminal adjudication and sentencing.2"9 Another important
factor is the lack of finality of judgements.2 60
The most important reason for judgements being unenforceable, however, is local
protectionism, which testifies so strongly to the fragmentation of the legal system.
2 6 1
Courts are extremely reluctant to enforce judgements against local enterprises, local
citizens, or authorities because local governments, on which the court depends, depend
on local enterprises and local banks for income and employment. They are all part of
the same bureaucratic family and every member must respect its local relatives.
The basic question remains whether it makes sense to define legal relationships
and transactions created by economic reforms, or to adopt an enormous amount of
legislation in view of WTO membership, if legislative enforcement cannot be guaranteed.
To overcome this problem the courts must be insulated from the pressures generated
by the Chinese Party-state. This can only happen if a more rigorous form of separation
of powers is respected. So far, dispute resolution is handed back to the administrative
domain by promoting arbitration and mediation.
4. Observations
Article X GATT is not just a question of piling up and publishing laws, but also about
how to administer a uniform, reasonable, and impartial legal system. It must be seen as
part of an expanded WTO concept of transparency. This section has demonstrated that
259. See Clarke, supra note 256, at 37. Apart from divorces there was not much civil work to do in
a planned economy. This is still reflected clearly in the court's hierarchy where the president
is involved in criminal adjudication, the vice-president in civil adjudication and the assistant
vice-presidents monitor the execution.
260. See also Clarke, supra note 256, at 38. A judgement should be final to be legally effective;
defendants have in fact numerous opportunities to re-litigate the merits of the case, or at
least to pose further procedural obstacles in the way of execution. See also Nanping Lui, A
Vulnerable Justice: Finality of Civil Judgments in China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35 (1999).
261. See Clarke, supra note 256, at 41-42 on local protectionism or difang boahuzhuyi. But not
only courts reason that way, also other institutions in Chinese society such as local banks
think in the same pattern. If an outside court demands a bank to freeze an account it is
very likely the bank will refuse to do so until a local court has authorised it to do so. An
often-secret contact between local courts and the debtor make it possible for that party to
shift funds and property because is was warned. In Shenzhen internal rules of the bank may
require this, although such requirements are prohibited in notices by the Supreme People's
Court and the People's Bank of China (Supreme People's Court, People's Bank of China,
Joint Notice on Investigating, Freezing and Levying on Bank Accounts of Enterprises, Insti-
tutions, Organs and Organisations, Dec. 28, 1983 and Supreme People's Court, People's Bank
of China, Supreme People's Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security, Notice on Inves-
tigation, Freezing, and Levying on Bank Accounts of Enterprises, Institutions, Organs and
Organization, Dec. 11, 1993). Banks are forbidden to transfer or unfreeze frozen funds or
to warn the depositor in advance of freezing, while courts for their part are told that when
there is a difference of opinion with a bank, the matter should be resolved through consul-
tation between the superiors of both court and bank instead of detaining bank personnel. In
one case a judge entrusted with enforcement replied that the government would not let him
finish the construction of his house if he executed what was demanded. In another case the
daughter of a judge was transferred to a remote place after her father executed a judgement.
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still many Chinese practices and habits exist, which are adverse to Article X GATT and
thus WTO transparency. All of which will not change overnight once China is admitted
to the WTO.
Therefore, policy changes are likely to continue to create uncertainties, with practice
contradicting policies. Further, there remain inconsistencies between national and local
legislation due to a lack of proper hierarchy of legal norms. Finally, Chinese courts have
discretion when administering the overall policy of regulation.
Stanley Lubman sees the only solution in thorough "institutional innovations that
can only be part of a political solution to the current fragmentation of authority."262
Donald Clarke agrees, stating that "[P]assing laws is not enough. Statutes can be effective
only within an appropriate institutional framework."263 In China, the administration is
not restrained by its own rules.264 Democratic political institutions, however, do not
necessarily make the economic process less complex and painful.2 65 Neither will the
Rule of Law be won in a single day, even if the regime becomes liberal democratic or
capitalist."6
Finally, transparency in Article X GATT encompasses the uniform application of law.
If China cannot live up to this requirement, an undeniable element of the rechtsstaat,
the country may deny benefits under the WTO framework to other members.
D. CONCLUSION
In order to join the WTO, it is generally accepted that China must comply with rules
formulated with a particular politico-economic structure in mind and which make sense
only in the context of that structure.16 1 China's economic, legal, and political structures
do not operate within the paradigm the WTO contemplates.268
International norms, like those created in the WTO framework, have played a
tremendously important role in guiding the remodelling of the legal and economic sys-
tem in China. Furthermore, a successful integration of China will certainly strengthen
the WTO's mandate. If the NTO persists in excluding China, its legitimacy as an organ-
isation would suffer.
The principles underlying the WTO were identified as the rule of law and the market
economy. These fundamental premises were closely examined and applied to China's
economic and legal reform process. Measured to compliance with Articles X (transparent
legal system) and XVII GATT and VIII GATS (state economy), it has been demonstrated
262. Lubman, supra note 220, at 259.
263. Clarke (1991), supra note 129, at 3. While law is often in principle the most appropriate
vehicle for reform, the effectiveness of it is compromised by the institutional environment in
which they must operate.
264. At least the Administrative Procedure Law, the State Compensation Law and the Regulations
on Administrative Reconsideration are only bleak attempts to exercise supervision and check
on administrative organs.
265. For example, Eastern European non-market economies and Russia. See Clarke (1991), supra
note 129, at 2.
266. See Ronald C. Keith, China's Struggle for the Rule of Law 5 (Macmillan, 1994).
267. See Donald C. Clarke, GATT Membership for China?, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 518 (1994).
268. Clarke, supra note 267, at 517.
Winter/Spring 2001 83
that Chinese reform is still unfinished, bringing about the transitional character of the
Chinese economy and legal system.
The politico-historical framework in which China's accession takes places raises con-
cerns about China's position as a constructive member of the multilateral trading system.
On a deeper level, this concern is rooted in the demand for reciprocity. The benefit to
China of WTO membership is rule-based, non-discriminatory market access at levels
that currently apply between WTO member nations. In exchange, however, WTO mem-
bers expect China to make commitments of equivalent value.269 Being a constructive
member of the international community is China's credit test, to see whether it can pay
the equivalent value.
Both the transitional character and the credit test must be adequately dealt with
in the accession negotiations, and explain why Chinese accession has dragged on for
so many years. However, the process of integrating the Chinese socialist economy will
stretch into the next decade or two. The main challenge ahead is for the WTO to ensure
that China's large state-owned economy does not enable the country to evade the effective
responsibilities and policies of GATT/WTO, even though the socialist market economy
can be in complete conformity with the technical rules of the WTO.
269. Eglin, supra note 1.

